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In The Supreme Court of 
The State of Utah 
LILLIAN JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.- CIVIL 
SINDA JACKSON, Executrix of the No. 7793 
Estate of JOHN JACKS~ON, deceased, 
Defendant. j 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEME·NT OF THE CASE 
In view of the manner in which plaintiff has made her 
statement of facts, we deem it necessary to make the fol-
lowing statement of facts in this case. 
Lillian Jackson is the plaintiff in this action. Lillian 
Jackson and John Jackson were married March 5, 1896. Sev-
en children were born the issue of said marriage. On the 
22nd day of April 1918, Lillian Jackson, John Jackson and 
their children were, and for some considerable time prior 
thereto had been, residents of and domi·ciled at Orland, 
Glenn County, State of California. Their marriage was not 
entirely happy and finally ended in a separation and a di-
vorce. 
On the 22nd day of April, 1918, at Orland, Glenn C'Oun-
ty, State of California, Lillian Jackson and John Jackson en-
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2 
tered into a written agreement, by the term·s of which they 
divided up their property, made a full and complete settle-
ment of all matters pertaining to and resulting from the 
marriage contract and separated. 
Said written agreement, so made, is attached to and 
made a part of the plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit 2 (R. 
page 8 to 14). Said agreement is set forth in full in the 
Court's Findings of Fact (R. page 124 to 130) . Lillian 
Jackson is the First Party and John Jackson is the 8econd 
Party to said written agreement of April 22, 1918. 
Lillian Jackson received as a result of s.aid agreement, 
the sum of approximately $28,689.00, which sum was a lit-
tle more than half of all property owned by John ·Jackson, 
and in consideration thereof she agreed with John Jackson 
in said written agreem~ent, among other things, as follows: 
" 
"WHEREAS, said first party contemplates 
and is about to commence and prosecute an action 
for divorce from and against said second party - - -
" 
"WHERE~AS in anticipation of such proceed-
ings of divorce being instituted by said first party 
against said s.econd party, it has been deemed to 
the interest of the aforesaid parties hereto and to 
their children, that a property adjustment be at 
this time made and entered into, whereby a divi-
sion of all of the properties, now owned and he'ld 
by the parties hereto, be made to the entire satis-
faction of the aforesaid parties and all persons con-
cerned. 
"NOW THE,RE1FOR.E this ag:.:eem·ent made 
and entered into by and between the parties afore-
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said, whereby for and in consideration of the cove-
nants hereinafter contained, and the payment, con-
veyances, transfers, assignments, etc. hereinafter 
set forth and specified, and all other considerations 
hereinbefore had and received by and between the 
parties aforesaid each to the other, does hereby 
forever release the other from any future claim or 
demand of either personal or property interests 
held by the other, either legally or morally, grow-
ing out of and by reason of the aforesaid parties 
hereto being or having been lawfully married. 
"It being the intention of these presents and 
the contract hereinby entered into and the consid-
erations herein specified, that the said party of the 
first part shall and will not make any further de-
mand of property division or interests in any pro-
ceeding at law or otherwise, growing out of or by 
reason of any action of divorce, said first party 
may institute and prosecute. And the property di-
vision hereinafter specified is and shall be in full 
settlement as complete adjustment of any claim or 
right whatsoever, either legally or morally said 
first party shall or may have upon said second par-
ty, or upon any of his property, as well as any claim 
or right, legally or morally that the childred above 
mentioned sh'all or may have therein save and ex-
cepting as hereinafter specified. 
"As a further consideration herein, the said 
party of the first part hereby promises and agrees 
that she will, and hereby does assu.me and agree to 
the sole and entire support hereafter of all of the 
following mentioned minor children, namely: Jesse 
Jackson, Fanny Jackson, Eldiva Jackson, Glenn 
Jackson, and Josephine Jackson, and it is under-
stood and agreed that the said party of the first 
part shall have and be decreed the custody of the 
aforesaid minor childred, and said first party 
further agrees that she will properly provide for, 
educate and care for all of said minor childred to 
their majority ; and further, said party of the first 
part hereby does and agrees to assume all legal 
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4 
and moral responsi~bility for the care and bringing 
up of said minor childred. 
"And said party of the second part hereby 
agrees to assume and provide for the support, edu-
cation, and care of John Jackson, Jr. until he shall 
reach his age of maturity. And it is hereby ex-
pressedly understood and agreed that said party 
of the second part shall at all times hereafter have 
the custody of said John Jackson, Jr., and hereby 
assumes all moral and legal responsibility for the 
support, education, and care of said Minor child, 
John Jackson, Jr. 
The said party of the first part further agrees 
that in event of the institution and prosecution 
of an action for divorce from said second par-
ty, that she shall bring such action and prosecute 
the same at her own and sole cost and expense, 
and that in or under or by virtue of such action, 
or any supplementary proceedings had therein, 
she shall and will not ask or demand of or from 
said second party any alimony or costs of action 
or any support or demand for and in behalf of 
any of the aforesaid minor childred to be in her 
custody, and of which she has assumed the re-
sponsibility of the care and education of. 
"It is hereby further understood and agreed 
that the said party of the second part shall not 
hereafter be responsible or liable for any debts or 
obligations incurred by said first party or any of 
the minor children in her behalf, from the date 
hereof. 
"The said party of the first part further 
agrees not to make any demand or request for the 
support, aid, or succor for herself or her minor 
children, upon said second party, and said se~cond 
party agrees to live separate and apart from said 
first party and not in any way interfere with or 
m'Olest her, or any of the children to be left in her 
t d " " cus 0 y. - - - - - - - -
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Said written agreement was sworn to by Lillian Jack-
son and John Jackson on the 22nd day of April, 1918 at Or-
land, Glenn County, State of California, before H. W. Elich-
feldt, a Notary Public in and for Glenn County, California. 
John Jackson thereafter moved from Orland, Califor-
nia, to Moab, Utah. On the 20th day of December, 1919, 
Lillian Jackson, in the Superior Court of the State of Cali-
fornia, in and for Glenn County, obtained an interlocutory 
decree of divorce from John Jackson (Plaintiff's Exhibit C) 
and on the 22nd day of January, 1921, said interlocutory 
decree of divorce was by final decree made final (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit D). 
On the 7th day of September, 1920, at Moab, Utah, 
Knox Patterson of the then law firm of Patterson and Con-
stantine prepared a Will for John Jackson (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit I) which is set forth in full in the Court's Findings (R. 
page 138 to 140.) On September 8th, 1920, Patterson and 
Constantine, by Geo. J. Constantine, mailed said Will by 
letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit H) to Mrs. Belle Dennis at Or-
land, California. In said Will of September 7, 19-20, (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit I) John Jackson bequeathed his estate as fol-
lows: 
"ARTICLE I. I give and bequeath to the sev-
en children of my marriage with Lillian Jackson 
as follows: 
" (a) To my daughter, Mrs. Belle Dennis, now 
of the age of 24 years the sum of Three Thousand 
Two Hundred and Fifty ($3,250.00) Dollars; she 
also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance pol- · 
icy with the Woodmen of the World to the extent 
of Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars. 
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" (b) To my son, Jesse Jackson, now of the 
age of 22 years, the sum of Thirty Five Hundred 
($3,500.00) Dollars. 
" (c) To my son, John Jackson, now of the age 
of 18 years, the sum of Thirty Five Hundred 
($3500.00) Dollars. 
" (d) To my daughter Fannie Jackson, now of 
the age of 16 years, the sum of Three Thousand 
Two Hundred and Fifty ($3,250.00) Dollars, she 
also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance poli-
cy with the Woodmen of the World to the extent of 
Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars. 
" (e) To my daughter, Aldiva Jackson, now 
of the age of 11 years, the sum of Three Thousand 
Two Hundred and Fifty ($3,250.00) Dollars, she 
also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance poli-
cy with the Woodmen of the World to the extent 
of Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars. 
" (f) To my son, Glen Jackson, now of the age 
of 8 years, the sum of Thirty Five Hundred 
($3,500.00) Dollars. 
" (g) To my daughter, Josephine Jackson, 
now of the age of 6 years, the sum of Three Thou-
sand Two Hundred and Fifty ($3250.00) Dollars; 
she also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance 
with the Woodmen of the World to the extent of 
Two Hundred and Fifty ($250.00) Dollars. 
"IN THE EVENT any of my said daughters 
shall die leaving surviving her no issue of her 
body, then and in that event the share she would 
have been entitled to shall be divided share and 
share alike between my children surviving her. 
IN THE· EVENT any of my said sons shall die 
leaving surviving him neither wife nor children, 
then and in that event the share he would have 
been entitled to shall be divided share and share 
alike between my children surviving him. 
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".-\.RTICLE II. I hereby nominate, constitute 
and appoint my daughter, !\'IRS. BELLE DENNIS 
the sole executrix of this will and testament and 
direct that she qualify and serve as such e~:ecu­
trix without bonds or securities whatever, \Vhether 
in the State of Utah, or elsewhere. 
"ARTICLE !II. In order that no misunder-
standing can arise I hereby state that at the time 
of my divorce fron1 my former wife, Lillian Jack-
son, I fully settled \Yith her in every particular 
and therefore the said Lillian Jackson shall in no 
'\vay participate in, nor is she entitled to any in-
terest whatsoever in my estate." 
Said Will was witnessed by Attorney Knox Patterson 
and Attorney Geo. J. Constantine, the two lawyers . con-
stituting the law firm of Patterson and (jonstantine. 
Attention is called to the fact that no provision what-
soever is made in the Will as to what disposition was to 
be made of the remainder of the property of John Jackson, 
other than as bequeathed to his children as aforesaid. There 
is no residuary clause in said Will. Said Will, therefore, not · 
only leaves to said children $·3500.00 each, but leaves the 
entire estate of John Jackson to said children. 
On October 3, 1921, John Jackson married Binda Jack-
son. Sinda Jackson is the Executrix of the Last Will and 
Testament of John Jackson, deceased, and the defendant 
in this action. Six children were born of this marriage. 
Their names and date of birth are as follows: 
Jim Jackson, born December 14, 1924. 
Opal Jackson Lemon, born April 29, 1928. 
Ellesa Jackson Day, born February 20, 1932. 
Alice Jackson, born December 24, 1935. 
Joe J acksHn, born June 13, 1938, and 
Jack Jackson, born January 24, 1941. 
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All of said children are living and are residents of Utah. 
Alice, Joe and Jack Jackson, three of said children, were 
dependent upon John Jackson at the time of his death for 
all of their support, education and maintenance and are 
now completely dependent upon his estate for their sup-
port, education and maintenance. 
On the 9th day of December, 1946, John Jackson made 
his Last Will and Testament. Said Will is s.et forth in full 
in the Court's Findings (R. pages 141 to 143). See also (R. 
page 220). By said Will John Jackson devised and be-
queathed one-half of all of his estate, real, personal and 
mixed, to his wif.e, Sinda Jackson. In paragraph third of 
said Will John Jackson provides for each of his children 
by his first marriage as follows: 
''Third.-! give, and bequeath to the six sur-
viving children of my marriage with Lillian Jack-
son, namely: Belle Dennis, my daughter; Jesse 
Jackson, my son; John Jackson, my son; Aldiva 
Jackson, my daughter; Glen Jackson, my son and 
Josephine Jackson, my daughter, the sum of one 
thousand dollars ($1000.00) each." 
All of the rest, residue and remainder of his estate he 
gave, devised and bequeathed to the children of his marri-
age with Sinda Jackson, namely, Jim Jackson, Opal Jack-
son, Ellesa Jackson, Alice Jackson, Joe Jackson and Jack 
Jackson, share and share alike. He appointed Sinda Jack-
son Executrix of his Last Will and Testament to serve with-
out bond. 
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In the seventh paragraph of his Will John Jackson 
provides as follows : 
"Seventh.-! hereby revoke all former wills 
and testamentary dispositions by me at any time 
made." 
John Jackson died May 1, 1950, at Moab, Grand Coun-
ty, Utah. At the time of his death he was a resident of 
Grand County, State of Utah. The Last Will and Testa-
ment of John Jackson, dated December 9, 1946, was duly 
admitted to probate by the District Court of Grand Coun-
ty, State of Utah, on the 2nd day of June, 1950. On said 
date Sinda Jackson was regularly appointed the Executrix 
of said Last Will and Testament and she is now and ever 
since the 2nd day of June, 1950, has been the duly appoint-
ed, qualified and acting Executrix of the Last Will and 
Testament of John Jackson, deceased. 
On September 1, 1950, Lillian Jackson, for the benefit 
of herself and her children (the children of John Jackson, 
deceased, and Lillian Jackson), namely: Belle Dennis, for-
merly Belle Jackson, Jeanne Raab, formerly Aldiva Jack-
son, Fanny Jackson, a dec-ease~ daughter, Joyce McKee, for-
merly Josephine Jackson, -Jesse Jackson, John Jackson and 
Glen Jackson, filed a claim against Sinda Jackson as the 
Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of John Jackson, 
deceased, for the sum of $24,500.00. A copy of said claim 
is attached to and made a part of plaintiff's complaint as 
Exhibit I (R. page 5 to 7). 
In said claim so presented to Sinda Jackson, as afore-
said, Lillian Jackson claims that at the time she made and 
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entered into the written agreement of April 22, 1918, above 
mentioned, at Orland, Glenn County, State of C:alifornia, 
she: 
"- - informed John Jackson, her husband, that 
she would not accept said agreement on a basis of 
a 50-50 split on their community property and at 
the same time assume all responsibility for care, 
control and education of said five (5) children. 
Whereupon said John Jackson agreed to and with 
the claimant in addition to the property so awarded 
to her under said agreement of April 22, 1918, he 
would make a will to all of his children bequeath-
ing to them the sum of $3500.00 each." 
Said alleged agreement to make a will and bequeath 
$3500.00 to each of the plaintiff's children is an oral agree-
ment claimed by plaintiff, Lillian Jackson, to have been 
made contemporaneously with and at the time that the 
written agreement of April 22, 1918, was made and entered 
into. There is no writing whatever evidencing such agree-
ment signed by John Jackson nor by his agent duly author-
ized. Said alleged oral agreem·ent of John Jackson to make 
a will bequeathing $3500.00 to each of his children is in 
direct contradiction to the written agreement of April 22, 
1918, above mentioned, and is an attempt to add to, alter 
and change the terms of said written agreement. 
Said claim so presented by Lillian Jackson was reject-
ed by the Executrix of the E'state of John Jackson, deceased, 
and on the 30th day of November, 1950, Lillian Jackson 
filed this action against Sinda Jackson, Executrix of the 
Estate of John Jackson, deceased, to enforce the terms of 
said alleged oral agr-eement to bequeath $3500.00 to each 
of Plaintiff's children, instead of the $1000.00 bequeathed 
to each of said children by the will of December 9, 1946. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF,S AMEND·ED COMPLAINT DOES NOT 
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE 
OF ACION. 
POINT II 
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED 
AGAINST THE REAL PARTIES IN INTER.EST BY SEC-
TIONS 102-9-4 and 102-9-9, U .. C.A. 1943, AND IS THE,RE-
FORE BARRED AGAINST THE· PLAINTIFF WHO 
CLAIMS TO SUE AS THE TRUSTEE OF AN EXPRESS 
TRUST. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN E.XCLUDING THE 
EVIDE·NCE O·F: 
(A) THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF, LILLIAN 
.JACKSON. 
(B) THE TESTIMONY OF KNOX PATTE,RSON. 
(C) THERE WERE NO 8E'PARATE WRITINGS 
RELATING TO THE· SAME SUBJE1CT WHICH 
COULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHE.R TO BE 
ADMITTED. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT MISCONTRUE THE STAT-
UTE OF FRAUDS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT E·RR ON THE QUESTIO·N OF 
PLAINTIFF'S PLEA OF ESTOPPEL. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT 
STATE FACTS SUFFlCIE:NT TO CONSTITUTE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed February 15, 
1951, (R. page 32). 
The question of whether the Amended Complaint 
stated a caus.e of action was argued to the Court at the 
pre-trial sessions of the Court. The Trial Court in its Pre-
Trial Order dated March 23, 1951, made the following 
Order: 
"BY THE· COURT: It is ordered on motion of 
of Mr. Patterson that all references to quantum 
meruit or the reasonable value of the service rend-
ered by the plaintiff to the said John Jackson, de-
ceased, be stricken and eliminated from this case." 
(R. page 93) . 
The Trial Court in its Pre-Trial Order dated April 3, 
1951, ordered that one of the issues to be resolved by the 
Court was: 
"Defendant reserves his defense that the 
Complaint does not state a cause of action." (R. 
page 99). 
In view of the stipulation of Counsel and the express 
ruling of the court, we are unable to understand plaintiff's 
statement found at page 49 of her brief which reads as 
follows: 
"There is no attack upon our pleading, no de-
murrer, no motion was filed in the cause and we 
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distinctly raise the issue of estoppel, as v,~en as 
fraud." 
Plaintiff sets forth in full as part of her Complaint 
the written agreement of April 22, 1918, (R. page 8). By 
said written agreement plaintiff assumed all responsibility 
for the care, control and education of her children. She 
received under said written agreement as compensation 
therefor, $28,689.00; said sum so received by her is admit-
tedly half if not more than half, of all of John Jackson's 
property. The Complaint in this action is based upon an 
alleged oral agreement made at the same time and contemp-
oraneously with the making of said written agreem·ent. 
Plaintiff claims that John Jackson by said oral agreement, 
agreed to "make a Will to his children bequeathing to them 
$3500.00 each", in consideration of plaintiff assuming all 
responsibility for the care, control and education of said 
children. This alleged oral agreement is in direct conflict 
with the plain and unequivocal terms of the written agree-
ment of April 22, 1918. 
In the face of said written agreement and the con-
sideration therein set forth and fully received by the plain-
tiff for taking care of her children there certainly was no 
consideration for the alleged oral agreement to make a 
will and leave to the plaintiff's children $3500.00 each in 
consideration of the plaintiff taking care of the children 
because she had already agreed in writing to do that very 
thing, and was paid in full for so doing. We conclude that 
there was no consideration whatsoever for the alleged 
oral agreement. The Amended Complaint for this reason, 
therefor, does not state a cause of action. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
Defendant pleaded as a defense to the plaintiff's origi-
nal Complaint the California Statute of Frauds, Section 
1973, California Code of Civil Proceedure and Section 1624, 
Civil Code of California, (R. pages 22 to 25). In view of the 
pleaded defense of the California Statute of Frauds, plain-
tiff voluntarily amended her Complaint in an attempt to 
meet the objections of the pleaded Statute of Frauds. 
Plaintiff in this regard at page 6 of her brief states: 
"We were required to amend our pleadings 
when the defendant set up the California Statute 
of Frauds. In doing so we qualified for the plea of 
estoppel." 
Plaintiff at page 12 of her brief states: 
"The Court, having taken this position that 
nothing short of a writing could prove the promise 
to make a will, it is remarkable that he ordered a 
pre-trial or permitted the case to go to trial at all. 
It is incomprehensible when we allege nothing but 
an oral contract in our complaint and the part per-
formance thereof by·the delivery of the Woodmen 
of the World certificate and the execution and de-
livery of the will, and the support and maintenance 
of all the children to maturity. (E·mphasis ours.) 
The court's attention is called to the fact that plaintiff 
in her . brief, spends 20 pages, pages 43 to 63 inclusive, 
arguing that the "Court should have considered plaintiff's 
plea of estoppel." Her complaint was amended to bring her 
within the equity jurisdiction of the court. The action 
could be nothing other than an action of specific perform-
ance of the alleged oral contract. Plaintiff's amended com-
plaint fails to state a cause of action. 
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Loper vs Flynn 165 P. 2d 256 ·(Cal.) 
D·e Mattos vs McGovern 77 P. 2d 522 (CaL) 
Beard vs Melvin 140 P. 2d 720 (Cal.) 
Murdock vs Swanson 193 P. 2d 81 (Cal.) 
Shive vs Barrow 199 P. 2d 693 (Cal.) 
See also the case of Andrews vs Aikens 44 Ida. 
797, 260 P. 423, 69 A.L.R. and the extensive an-
notation covering approximately 204 pages im-
mediately following the said case. The annotation 
begins at 69 A.L.R. 14 and concludes at page 219. 
We also refer the court to the many other cases on this 
question cited by us in our brief. 
We also claim that the complaint does not state a cause 
of action against the defendant because there are no suffi ... 
cient or any allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint 
showing how or in what manner the plaintiff is the trustee 
of an express trust. 
We believe that what we have said above should dis-
pose of this case without the consideration of any of the 
other questions raised by the plaintiff in her brief and that 
the judgment of the lower court should therefor be sus-
tained because: 
Plaintiff's amended complaint does not state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
POINT II 
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BAR.RED 
AGAINST THE REAL PARTIES IN INTE,REST BY 
SE1CTIONS 102-9-4 and 102-9-9, U.C.A. 1943, AND IS 
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THEREFORE BARRED AGAINS·T THE PLAINTIFF 
WHO CLAIMS TO SUE AS THE TRUSTEE OF AN EX-
PRESS TRUST. 
Our argument with respect to Point II appears at 
pages 33 to 38 inclusive of this brief. We refer this 
court therefore for our argument on this point, to the 
above pages. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE 
EVIDE.NCE· OF: (A) THE TESTIMONY OF PLAIN-
TIFF, LILLIAN JACKSON. 
At the outset may we state that we made five ob-
jections to the testimony of the plaintiff Lillian Jackson, 
ex-wife of the deceased John Jackson at the time she was 
on the witness stand. Said objections so made are as fol-
lows: 
(1) That the plaintiff, Lillian Jackson, is an incom-
petent witness under the provisions of Section 104-49-2 
(Subsection 3) Utah Code Annotated 1943, now Section 
104-24-2, Sub-section 3, Chapter 24, of Chapter 58, Session 
Laws 1951, commonly known as the ''Dead Man Statute." 
(R. page 202). 
(2) That under the provisions of Section 1973, Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, an agreement which by its 
terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the 
promissor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any 
property or to make any provision for any person by will 
is invalid unless the same or some note or memorandum 
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thereof be in writing and subscribed by the party to be 
charged or by his agent and evidence therefor of the agree-
ment cannot be received without the writing or· secondary 
evidence of its contents. (R. pag.e 201). 
(3) That under the provisions of Section 1624, Civil 
Code of California, an agreement which by its terms is 
not to be performed during the lifetime of the promissor 
or an agreement to devise or bequeath any property or to 
make any provision for any person by will is invalid unless 
the same or some note or memorandum thereof is in 
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or his 
agent. (R. page 202). 
(4) That the testimony of Lillian Jackson is an at-
tempt to alter, vary, contradict and change the contents 
of a written instrument to wit: Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 which 
is attached to and made a part of the plaintiff's Complaint 
(R. page 8 to 14), and which agreement is set forth in full 
in the Findings (R. page 124 to 130) . 
(5) That plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim 
against the defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
(R. page 202). 
Counsel for the plaintiff, in his brief, disregards all 
of the objections made to the testimony of the plaintiff, 
Lillian Jackson, except one which is obj.ection (1) above. 
He says that Lillian Jackson is not an incompetent witness 
under the "Dead Man Statute" because she is suing in a 
representative capacity, to-wit: As trustee of an express 
trust under Section 104-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
but which actually should be Rule 17 (a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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We contend that the objections made to the testi-
mony of the plaintiff and the objection that plaintiff is 
an incompetent witness are well taken and should each 
be sustained. 
( 1) Is the plaintiff an incompetent witness under 
the "Dead Man Statute?" 
We say she is. 
This is an action by Lillian Jackson, the ex-wife of 
the deceased, John Jackson, as plaintiff, against Sinda 
Jackson, Executrix of the Estate of John Jackson, de-
ceased. Sinda Jackson is the surviving widow of John 
Jackson, deceased, and she is the Executrix of the Last 
Will and Testament of John Jackson, deceased. Sinda 
Jackson as the representative of the Estate of John Jack-
son, deceased, is sued as defendant by this plaintiff. Lillian 
Jackson is the plaintiff and she is also the witness under 
consideration in this case. Lillian Jackson as plaintiff and 
as witness is opposing and suing the representative of the 
estate to the extent that she is seeking by her action and 
testimony to take away from the estate the sum of $24,-
500.00; Sinda Jackson, the executrix and representative 
of the estate, the defendant herein, is protecting the in-
tegrity of the estate. 
Section 104-49-2 (Sub-section 3), Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, now Section 104-24-2 (Sub-section 3), Chapter. 
24 of Chapter 58, Session Laws 1951, hereinafter referred 
to as the "Dead Man Statute" reads in part as follows: 
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"vV'ho May Not Be Witnesses.- - -
(3) A party to any civil action, suit or pro-
ceeding9 and any person directly interested in the 
event thereof, and any person from, through or 
under whom such party or interested person de-
rives his interest or title or any part thereof, when 
the adverse party in such action, suit or proceeding 
claims or opposes, sues or defends, as guardian of 
an insane or incompetent person, or as the execu-
tor or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any 
deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or gran-
tee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or 
devisee, as to any statement by, or transaction 
with, such deceased, insane or incompetent person, 
or matter of fact 'vhatever, which must have been 
equally within the knowledge of both witness and 
such insane, incompetent or deceased person, un-
less, such witness is called to testify thereto by 
such adverse party so claiming or opposing, suing 
or defending, in such action, suit or proceeding." 
The above section expressly makes incompetent as a 
witness, "a party to any civil action, suit or proceeding," 
and it would seem clear that Lillian Jackson, who is both 
plaintiff and witness in this case, by the plain language of 
the statute is an incompetent witness under said statute. 
Counsel in his brief argues. in substance that the langu-
age "a party to any civil action, suit or proceeding" has a 
special meaning and that the word "party" doesn't. mean 
''party to a law suit," because plaintiff is suing as the 
"trustee of an express trust." 
It is our contention. that the statutory disqualification 
as a witness of a person who is "a party to any civil action, 
suit or proceeding" means what it says; that is, that the 
party to said suit .is dis·qualified and incompetent as a wit-
ness. This section of the "Dead Man Statute" makes incom-
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petent as a witness a party to any civil suit or proceeding. 
It makes no difference whether the party witness is plain-
tiff or defendant. 
Ewing vs. White, 8 Utah 250, 30 Pac. 984. 
Hennefer vs. Hays, 14 Utah 324, 47 Pac. 90. 
Kimball vs. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 Pac. 313. 
Clark vs. Clark, 7 4 Utah 290, 279 Pac. 502. 
In the cas,e of Clark vs. George, 234 Pac. (2d) 844, 
(Utah) reading from page 847, the court states: 
"lone was a party plaintiff. She was properly 
prohibited from testifying as to conversations with 
the decedent in conformance with our so-called 
. "dead man's statute," section 104-49-2 (3), U.C. 
A. 1943, Clark vs. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502." 
Section 1880, California Code of Civil Procedure, deal-
ing with persons who cannot testify, Section 3, reads as fol-
lows: 
"3. (Parties, etc., against executors, etc.) 
Parties or assignors of parties to an action or pro-
ceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or 
proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or 
administrator upon a claim, or demand against the 
estate of a deceased person, as to any matter or 
fact occurring before the death of such deceased 
person." 
The California law above quoted is dissimilar to our 
Utah statute, to he sure, but the California statute makes 
incompetent as witnesses parties to an action or proceeding 
against an executor or administrator upon a claim or de-
mand against the estate, etc. 
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At common law no person was permitted to become a 
witness in an action or proc·eeding to which he was a party 
or in which he \vas interested. 70 C. J ., paragraph 260, page 
193; 70 C.J., paragraph 261, page 194. The common law 
disabilities of witnesses have been abrogated in Utah by 
Section 104-49-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (now Section 
104-24-1, Chapter 24 of Chapter 58, Session Laws 1951). 
The abrogation of said common law disabilities is sub-
ject, however, to the exceptions set forth in Section 104-
49-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, one of which exceptions 
is the Utah "Dead Man Statute" above s·et forth. 
In framing the exceptions provided by said Section 
104-49-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943 to the provisions of 
Section 104-49-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (now Section 
104-24-1, Session Laws 1951), the Legislature must have 
intended to use the words "party" and "parties" to an action 
in the usual and appropriate meaning in law; otherwise, it 
would not have passed Section 88-2-11, Utah Code Annota-
ted 1943, which reads as follows: 
"Words and phrases are to be construed accord-
ing to the context and the approved usage of the 
language; but technical words and phrases, and 
such others as have acquired a peculiar and appro-
priate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, 
are to be construed according to such peculiar and 
appropriate meaning or definition.'' 
Section 104-49-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (now Sec-
tion 104-24-1, Session Laws 1951), is substantially the same 
as Section 1879, California Code of Civil Procedure, and 
Section 88-2-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is almost word 
for word with Section 16, California Code of Civil Procedure. 
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The California courts in construing the meaning of the 
words "party" and "parties" to an action or proceeding 
under the "Dead Man Statute" have held that executors 
and administrators are parties under the law prohibiting 
parties in actions to testify. 
In the case of Roncelli vs. Fugazi, 186 Pac. 373 (Cal.), 
the Court, reading from pages 375 and 376, says: 
"While section 1880 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure has often received the consideration of the 
appellate courts of this state, the reports do not 
show it to have been previously involved in an in-
quiry to determine whether the word 'parties,' as 
therein used, is broad enough in meaning to apply 
to a party to the record suing only in his repre-
sentative capacity. This question is purely one of 
interpretation. We can neither abridge nor extend 
the scope of the terms of the section, nor should we 
concern ourselves with the philosophy of the rule 
established by the section, or speculate as to the 
motives which impelled the Legislature to enact 
it, except it be in aid of the discovery of the real 
meaning of its items. The very words of the stat-
ute must control. Moore vs. Schofield, 96 Cal. 486, 
31 Pac. 532. Its inhibitions have been held to apply 
to the testimony of a person who is merely a nomi-
nal party to an action. As stated in Blood vs. Fair-
banks, 50 c·ai. 420 : 
' - - - The statute does not merely exclude par-
ties who have or are supposed to have an interest 
adverse to the estate of the decedent, but, by its 
terms renders all the nominal parties to the action 
incompetent.' 
"In framing the exceptions provided by sec-
tion 1880 to the general enabling act (section 1879, 
Code Civ. Proc.), the Legislature must have in-
tended to use the word 'parties' in its usual and 
appropriate meaning in law (section 16, Code Civ. 
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Proc.). If it had been intended to render the testi-
mony of a party to the record, suing in his repre-
sentative capacity. admissible undf'r tb e ci, cun1-
stances stated in the statute, it would have been a 
very simple matter to have so declared in the stat-
ute itself, as \Yas done in the Washington statute, 
\Yhere it is provided that the exclusion of the testi-
mony of a party to the record 'shall not apply to 
parties of record who sue or defend in a repre-
sentative or fiduciary capacity and who have no 
further interest in the action.' Since our statute of 
exclusion uses the word 'parties' in its broad gen-
eric sense, we do not deem it proper to restrict its 
meaning to smaller compass, thus confining its ap-
plication to parties to the record suing in their in-
dividual capacities. 
"Under an Ohio statute providing that 'a par-
ty shall not testify where the adverse party is - - -
an executor of a deceased person,' etc. (Rev_ St. & 
5242), the Supreme Court of that state held that 
the inhibition of the statute applied to an executor 
prosecuting an action in his representative capac-
ity against the defendant as executrix. Farley v. 
Lisey, 55 Ohio St. 627, 45 N. E. 1103. In that case 
the court said : 
'True, the plaintiff was prosecuting the action 
in his representative character as executor of the 
lessor; but the issues in the action were joined be-
tween him as such and the defendant; and he was 
interested in maintaining the issues in his ~behalf, 
not only in his representative capacity, but indi-
vidually also to the extent, at least, that his com-
pensation was affected by the amount recovered 
in the action. The statute has reference to the ad-
verse character which the parties sustain toward 
each other as parties in the action at the time of 
the trial, and not necessarily to their relation as 
parties to the transaction which is the subject of 
the action or defense; and, unless these parties 
were adverse, there were none in the action, for 
they were the only parties. It is said the plaintiff 
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might have resigned as executor, and then he 
would have been competent to testify as desired; 
but then he would no longer be a party to the 
action, and therefore not within the inhibition of 
the statute. But, being a party to the action when 
his testimony was offered, it was properly ex-
cluded.' " 
The Iowa Court, in considering the question at issue 
in this case, in the case of In Re Conner's E~state, 36 N.W. 
(2d) 833, reviews the Iowa cases on this point and at pages 
839 and 840 says: 
" - - - Over objections by appellants that he 
was an incompetent witness under the dead man 
statute, section 622.4, the cou:rt permitted Mr. 
Updegraff, executor of Zanette's estate, to repeat 
com~munications between the witness and Zanette 
in which she detailed the story of Ellis' lineage. 
Error is predicated upon these rulings. We con-
clude this assignment of error is well founded. 
"Mr. Updegraff was a party to the action 
within the purview of the dead man statute. Will-
iams v. Barrett, 52 Iowa 637, 641, 3 N. W. 690, 
693, states: 
'Counsel for appellent contend that the wit-
ness was competent because he had no interest 
whatever in the question (concerning which he 
testified). - - - This may be conceded, but the lan-
guage (of the statute) --- is plain and explicit 
that 'no party to any action or proceeding - - -
shall be examined as a witness - - - against the ex-
ecutor of heir at law - - -of such deceased per-
sons., ---John T. Clark was a party to the action, 
and for that reason was disqualified as a witness 
to testify to personal transactions between him-
self and the deceased. We think the fact that the 
other defendants were not necessarily jointly lia-
ble with him, and that separate actions might 
have been maintained against the defendant, 
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makes no difference. There was but one action on 
trial, and the witness, being a proper party de-
fendant therein, \Yas by the very terms of the sta-
tute incompetent to testify to the facts under con-
sideration.' 
"Bohle v. Brooks et al., 225 Iowa 980, 983, 282 N. W. 
351, 353, states: 
' - - - Even though the interest of Mr. Brooks 
is only nominal, yet he is a party to the action, 
and in conformity with the statute and our form-
er pronouncements, as such party he is incompe-
tent to testify as to the personal transactions 
with the decedent.' 
"Burton v. Baldwin, 61 Iowa 283, 285, 16 
N.W. 110, 111, held incompetent the testimony of 
Sophronia Baldwin who was made a party to a 
partition proceeding for the purpose of ascertain-
ing and assigning her dower, and stated: 
' - - - She is a party to the action; her testi-
mony relates to a personal communication be-
tween herself and a person now deceased, and is 
given against the heir at law of such deceased 
person. It ·is true, she has no interest in common 
with the other defendants against the plaintiff, 
but such adverse interest does not seem to be 
necessary in order to the exclusion of the testi-
mony.' 
''In the language of Clinton Savings Bank v. 
Underhill, 115 Iowa 292, 294, 88 N.W. 357, 358: 
' - - - A mere nominal party, or one who has 
no substantial interest in the action, is disquali-
fied under this ·section.' 
"To the same effect is Nugent v. Dittel, 213 
Iowa 671, 239 N. W. 559. 
"In Fry v. Gullion, 143 Iowa 719, 724, 121 
N.W. 563, 565, 21 Ann. Cas. 285, parties to parti-
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tion proceedings filed a disclaimer. The court said 
this 'may possibly have removed the disqualifica-
tion of interest but it could not remove the dis-
qualification which still attached to them as par-
ties, unless we are able to say that they were no 
longer proper parties to the action.' 
"James v. Fairall, 168 Iowa 427, 431, 148 N. 
W. 1029, was an action to set aside a will. A devi-
see who had been made a party defendant filed a 
disclaimer and the action was dismissed as to 
him. The court held the circumstances indicated 
collusion with plaintiff and the dismissal did not 
have the effect of making his evidence compe-
tent." 
"An article by Mason Ladd in 19 Iowa Law 
Review 521, 526, discusses the decisions and 
states: 
'The statute excludes parties because they 
are parties and as distinguished from persons in-
terested in the litigation. - - - The cases in the 
above situations have applied literally the statute 
which is apparently based on the theory that 
even nominal parties would be sufficiently con-
cerned in the interests which they merely repre-
sent to be unsafe as witnesses.' 
"In considering his competency under the 
dead man statute Updegraff as a witness may not 
be separated from Updegraff, executor. This 
court held in Schmid v. Kreismer, 31 Iowa 479, 
that while generally an administrator is a compe-
tent witness for the estate, he is not. competent 
in a case where the adverse party is also an ad-
ministrator." 
Counsel for the plaintiff cite·s and relies upon the case 
of In Re Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193; 72 Pac. 942. The case of 
In Re Van Alstine does not support counsel's position for 
two reasons : 
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(1) Because the Van Alstine case is a case involving 
a will contest and the Utah Case of Miller vs. Livingston, 31 
Utah 415; 88 Pac. 338, holds that a will contest is not with-
in the_ statute and the guardian ad litem contesting the will 
is not within the class excluded. It is settled in this state by 
the Livingston case that a will contest is not within the 
statute. The case of Miller vs. Livingston was an action by 
the daughter against the administratrix of her father's 
estate to have the will revoked because of undue influence 
of the decedent's second wife, not the contestant's mother. 
The plaintiff called other daughters to testify as to conver-
sations with and the conduct of the testator and they were 
not permitted to testify. The court held this to be error. The 
court in the case of Miller vs. Livingston, 88 Pac. 338, read-
ing from pages 344 and 345, states: 
"The statute in this regard is intended to 
protect the estates of deceased persons from as-
saults, 'and relates to proceedings wherein the 
decision sought by the party so testifying would 
tend to reduce or impair the estate, and does not 
relate to the relative rights of the heirs or devi-
sees as to the distribution of an estate in a pro-
ceeding by which the estate itself is in no event 
to be reduced or impaired.' (Citing cases). These 
authorities, and other which can be cited, hold 
that the controversy such as here is between liv-
ing parties, who, on the one side, are the devisees 
or legatees under the will, and on the other, the 
heirs at law of the testator. The former claim to 
take the estate under the will, the latter, under 
the statute regulating the descent of estates, in-
sisting that the alleged will is a nullity. The act 
of the testator in making the alleged will is the 
only subject-matter of the investigation. The es-
tate of the testator is not interested. The inter-
ests of those claiming to succeed to it either by 
operation of law or by operation of the will are 
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alone involved. The estate remains intact and un-
diminished whatever may be the result of the 
controversy, and the subject-matter of the inves-
tigation is not a transaction with nor a statement 
by the decedent. As to such an investigation, the 
parties to the suit and those interested in the re-
sult thereof are upon terms of equality in regard 
to the opportunity of giving testimony. Our con-
clusion, therefore, is that all the parties interest-
ed are competent to testify to any fact which is 
relevant and material to the issues involved, and 
that the court erred in excluding the proffered 
testimony." and, 
(2) Because at the trial in the Van Alstine case when 
Dora S. Van Alstine, the guardian ad litem, was called as a 
witness for the minors, the only objection made to her com-
petency as a witness was, reading from page 943: 
"on the ground that under the provisions of 
Section 3348 of the Revised Statutes, if judg-
ment should be rendered against the contestants 
of the will- - - cost might be assessed against her 
and she, therefore, had a direct interest in the 
event of the suit and was disqualified as a witness 
under Sub-division 3, paragraph 3413, Rev. St. 
1898." 
The objection was based entirely on the interest of the 
witness and not upon the fact that the witness was a party 
to the action, and the question of whether a party to an 
action is dis~qualified as a witness was never presented to 
nor decided by the court. 
Counsel cites the case of Grieve vs. Howard, 54 Utah 
225; 180 Pac. 423, as holding that, "Mack Howard, a defend-
ant, was held to be qualified to testify because of the fact 
that he had no interest, a merely nominal defendant." We 
do not understand the Grieve case to hold as counsel states. 
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In the Grieve case a special administrator brought an action 
to set aside for undue influence in procuring it, a deed exe-
cuted by the deceased to the defendant. The defendant 
sought to rule out testimony of the administrator as to 
transactions equally within his knowledge and that of the 
deceased. This was an attempt to close the mouth of one 
who endeavored to protect or increase the estate. The gran-
tee attempted to use the rule in reverse. The statute was 
not applicable to make incompetent such witness. 
Judge Thurman in the Grieve vs. Howard case, 180 Pac. 
423, reading from page 429, says: 
" - - - A reasonably careful analysis of this 
statute will conclusively demonstrate that, in 
view of the relation and character of the parties, 
the matter was not within the statute. As. we un-
derstand the situation, defendant was defending 
not as an heir of the deceased, but as a grantee 
under the deed executed by her. The relation was 
not such as to entitle him to object to the testi-
mony on the grounds that it was prohibited by 
the statute. Miller v. Livingstone, 31 Utah at 
page 435, 88 Pac. 338; 40 Cyc. 2270 to 2275, inclu-
sive." 
The last Utah case cited by counsel in his brief is the 
case of Staats vs. Staats, 63 Utah 470; 226 Pac. 677. In this 
case the testator's son, who was also the surviving partner, 
sued his mother and intervening brothers. The court in per-
mitting the plaintiff and other heirs to testify concerning 
transactions with the deceased, reading from 226 Pac. at 
page 680 says : 
"In view, therefore, that she is here claiming 
in her own right the other heirs are competent 
witnesses. - - - That the statute has no applica-
tion where the controversy arises between or 
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among the heirs and merely involves questions 
relating to their respective rights as such and 
where there is no assault upon the estate." 
Judge Wolfe, in commenting upon the case of Staats 
vs. Staats, in Maxfield vs. Sainsbury, 172 Pac. (2d) 122 
(Utah), and reading from page 131 states, that the Staats 
case is somewhat puzzling and concludes that the Staats 
case, 
"appears to be technically wrong so far as 
correctly applying Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, is concerned." 
This Court in the case of Wood vs. Fox, 8 Utah 380, 
32 Pac. 48, has held that an action to establish a resulting 
trust against the estate of a deceased person was a claim 
or demand against such estate. This case was carried to 
the Supreme Court of the United States and is reported 
in 17 Sup. Ct. 713, 41 L. Ed. 1145. The Supreme Court of 
the United States said, speaking through Justice Harlan: 
"We cannot doubt that the claims as asserted 
in this suit by Whitney are within the meaning 
of the Utah statute, claims or demands against 
the estate of a deceased person. - - - The Supreme 
court of Utah properly rejected the suggestion 
that such claim or demand was not against the 
estate of Lawrence." 
The court held that the plaintiff was an incompetent 
witness as to testimony of transactions with the decedent. 
We have copied from and we are grateful for the very 
scholarly discussions of the so-called "Dead Man Statute" 
in the article written by Mr. Justice Wolfe in 13 Rocky 
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Mountain Law Review, 282, (June, 1941) which also ap-
peared in the Utah Bar Journal, Volum.e 11, July-August, 
1941, Nos. 7 and 8. It has been of considerable assistance 
to us. 
Plaintiff cites 58 Am. Jur., Section 282, which reads 
as follows: 
"A statute disqualifying a 'party' from testi-
fying as to transactions with a deceased person 
does not apply to one who is not a party or inter-
ested therein but is a mere witness. According to 
some authorities, although on its face the statute 
disqualifies every person who is made a party to 
the record, its application is limited to those per-
sons who are properly joined as parties, and fur-
ther to those of the proper parties to the record 
who are parties to the issue." 
To support the position that plaintiff is a competent 
witness and after citing the above section, counsel for 
plaintiff abruptly concludes in his brief at page 23 as 
follows: 
"Thus it appears that the term 'party' is 
generally meant to include only those who are 
directly interested in the result of the suit." 
This is, however, not our statute. Our Dead Man 
Statute clearly makes incompetent (1) a party to any 
civil action, suit or proceeding, and it also makes incompe-
tent (2) any person directly interested in the event there-
of, and also makes incompetent (3) any person from, 
through or under whom such party or interested person 
derives his interest or title or any part thereof. 
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Under the plain reading of the Utah Dead Man Stat-
ute one does not. have to have any direct interest in the 
result of the suit to be incompetent as a witness. It is suf-
ficient to make one incompetent as a witness if one is a 
party to any civil action, suit or proceeding. 
A careful reading of Section 282, above cited by the 
plaintiff, seems to be against plaintiff's position rather 
than for her. The last portion of the quoted section refers 
to "parties to the issue." Our Dead Man Statute says "a 
party to any civil action, suit or proceeding." We do not 
think the cited section applicable under our Dead Man 
Statute. 
Plaintiff cites the Minnesota case of Exsted vs. Ex-
sted, 202 Minn. 521, 279 N.W. 554, 117 A.L.R. 599. This case 
is not in point and does not sustain plaintiff's contention. 
The Minnesota Dead Man statute states: "It shall not be 
competent for any party to an action - - - to give evidence 
therein of or concerning any controversy - - - relative to 
any matter at issue betwe·en the parties." 2 Masson's Minn. 
St. 1927, paragraph 9817 (MSA, paragraph 594.04). It has 
been held that the term "party to an action," under the 
above statute, means a party to the issue to which the tes-
timony relates, and not merely a party to the record, 
Bowers vs. Schuler, 54 Minn. 99, 55 N.W. 817, and that an 
executor or administrator while a necessary party to the 
record is not a party to the issue, Exsted vs. Exsted, above 
cited. The Exsted case is, therefore, not in point under the 
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Utah Dead Man Statute. The two statutes are entirely dif-
ferent. 
The case of Doty vs. Doty, 118 Kentucky 204, 80 S. 
W. 803, 2 L. R. A. (NS) 713, cited by plaintiff is not in 
point. The Kentucky dead man statute is entirely different 
and is in no way even similar to the Utah Dead Man Stat-
ute. The Kentucky statute provides, "No person shall tes-
tify for himself." Our statute says, "A party to any civil 
action, suit or proceeding," is incompetent as a witness. 
The Kentucky case is not in point under the Utah dead 
man statute. The two statutes are entirely different. 
Lillian Jackson was therefore, an incompetent wit-
ness under the plain mandate of the Utah D'ead Man Stat-
ute which declares that, "A party to any civil action, suit 
or proceeding," is incompetent as a witness. 
We believe that from what we have said above it is con-
clusive that Lillian Jackson is an incompetent witness. How-
ever, we desire to call the Court's attention to the interest 
of the plaintiff in the result of this action and the pecu-
liar manner in which this interest shows up. Plaintiff, in 
paragraph 4 of her Complaint, alleges, "That said dece-
dent in his lifetime became indebted to this plaintiff and 
to her sons and daughters in the sum of $24,500.00, such 
indebtedness to be paid upon the death of the decedent." 
(R. Page 1) . Paragraph 5 of the Complaint says in part, 
"That on or about August 10, 1950, the plaintiff duly filed 
her claim against the said Sinda Jackson as Executrix of 
said estate for the sum of $24,500." (R. page 1 and 2). Said 
claim filed by the plaintiff against the Executrix of said es-
state of John Jackson, deceased, says in part, "thus leaving 
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due to this claimant and her children, the real parties in in-
terest," (R. Page 6) and again in said claim plaintiff says, 
"That the amount of the foregoing claim, to-wit: Twenty-
four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($24,500.00) is just-
ly due to said claimant and her children." (R. Page 6). 
Said claim, upon which this action is based, was filed 
September 1, 1950, by Lillian Jackson for the benefit of 
herself and her children, namely, Belle Dennis, Jeanne 
Raab, Fanny Jackson, a deceased daughter, Joyce McKee 
Jesse Jackson, John Jackson, Jr., and Glenn Jackson. 
Strange things went on in regard to the claims filed 
against the Estate of John Jackson, deceas-ed. Lillian Jack-
son, the plaintiff, filed her claim upon which this action 
is brought on September 1, 1950, for and on behalf of her-
self and her seven children, as aforesaid, one of whom, 
Fanny Jackson, was dead. On October 16, 1950, Belle Den-
nis, Jeanne Raab, Joyce McKee, Jesse Jackson and Glenn 
Jackson, and on November 30, 1950, John Jackson, they 
being all of the living children of the plaintiff and the de-
ceased, John Jackson, each filed separate identical claims 
against the Estate of John Jackson, deceased. A copy of 
said identical claims so filed by each of said children 
reads, except as to title of Court and cause and acknowl-
edgem·ent, as follows : 
"By reason of a marriage settlement made 
between John Jackson deceased, and Lillian Jack-
son, fo~mer wife of John Jackson and the mother 
of this claimant, wherein and whereby the said 
John Jackson agreed with Lillian Jackson, as a 
part of said marriage settlement, that he would 
provide by will that claimant would receive the 
s urn of _ ----------------_ ---------------------------_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ $3,500.00 
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upon the death of the said John Jackson; which 
said "~ill was duly executed on the 7th day of Sep-
tember, 1920, and duly filed with the clerk of the 
District Court of Grand County, State of Utah, a 
copy of said will being hereto attached and made 
a part of this claim. 
"That there were seven sons and daughters of the 
said John Jackson and my mother Lillian Jackson, 
and it was provided in said will that each thereof 
should receive the sum of $3500; that since the 
execution of said will one of the daughters has 
died, leaving one-sixth of her share of said be-
quest provided for in said will to this claimant-$ 583.33 
"Said gift and bequest in said will were made 
at the express request of my mother, Lillian Jack-
son, for our mutual benefit, and in lieu of any 
provisions for the sopport, education, comfort and 
maintenance of the children of said John Jackson 
and Lillian Jackson." 
$4,083.33 
That each and all of said claims, except the claim of 
John Jackson, were rejected on October 16, 1950, and no-
tice of rejection was duly served and filed October 16, 1950, 
with the Clerk of the Court; that the claim of John Jack-
son was rejected on the 30th day of November, 1950; that 
notice of rejection of said claim was duly S·erved ap.d filed 
November 30, 1950, with the Clerk of the Court; that the 
time for presenting claims against the Estate of John 
Jackson, deceased, expired on th·e lOth day of October, A. 
D. 1950; Decree establishing due and legal notice to credi-
tors in the Estate of John Jackson, deceased, was duly 
made and entered by the Court on the 26th day of Janu-
ary, 1951. E~ach and all of said claims were rejected by 
the Executrix of the Estate of John Jackson, deceased.; 
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notice of rejection of ·each of said claims was duly served 
and filed with the Clerk of the Court; more than three 
months have expired since the serving and filing of each 
of such notices of Rej-ection; no suit has ever been filed 
in any Court whatsoever against the Executrix of the 
Estate of John Jackson, deceased, by any of said living chil-
dren on any of said claims so presented, rejected and filed. 
The only suit ever filed to enforce any claim against 
the Estate of John Jackson, deceased, is the Complaint 
filed in this action by Lillian Jackson, as plaintiff, against 
Sinda Jackson, Executrix of the Estate of John Jackson, 
deceased, based on the clai·m presented and filed by the 
plaintiff, Lillian Jackson, on S.eptember 1, 1950, as afore-
said. E.ach and all of the living children of Lillian Jack-
son, the plaintiff, and the deceased, John Jackson, has 
abandoned his claim filed against said e·state as aforesaid. 
In any event, none of the living children has ever at any 
time filed any suit to recover on any of the claims so filed 
and rejected as aforesaid, and each and all of said claims 
are barred by the provisions of Section 102-9-4, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, and Section 102-9-9, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943. We pleaded these matters as a defense to this 
action (our ans:wer) to complaint as amended. (R. Page 
48 to 54). 
Yet, this plaintiff shows her interest by prosecuting 
this action and has gone to the extent of taking an appeal 
to this Court. 
There is another interesting matter in connection 
with this case. Fanny Jackson, one of the children for 
whos·e benefit plaintiff claims she brings this lawsuit, is 
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dead. She died long before any claim was ever presented 
by the plaintiff and long before this law-suit was ever 
started. No legal representative of the Estate of Fanny 
Jackson, deceased, has ever been appointed and no legal 
representative of the Estate of Fanny Jackson, deceased, 
has ever presented a claim against the Estate of John 
Jackson, deceased, and yet, Lillian Jackson, the plaintiff 
in this action, presumes to file such a claim against the 
Estate of John Jackson, deceased, for and on behalf of 
said F~nny Jackson, deceas·ed, and then presumes to file 
suit for and on her behalf without ever being appointed 
administratrix or executrix of the Estate of Fanny Jack-
son, deceased. The plaintiff claims to be the trustee of 
an express trust for all of her living children and also 
claims to be the trustee of an express trust for her de-
ceased daughter upon the curious theory set forth in para-
graph 8 of plaintiff's Complaint, which reads as follows: 
"8. That the aforesaid agreement with reference 
to the making of a will by the said John Jackson 
and providing that their children should be bene-
ficiaries thereof was made with this plaintiff 
in trust, to be administered by her in behalf of 
the following named sons and daughters, the is-
sue of the marriage between this plaintiff and 
John Jackson, namely: 
Age at time of 
making will 
Belle Dennis, formerly Belle J acks.on 24 years 
Jeanne Raab, form·erly Aldiva Jackson 11 years 
Fanny Jackson 16 years 
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Joyce McKee, formerly 
Josephine Jackson 6 years 
Jesse Jackson 22 years 
John Jackson, Jr. 18 years 
Glenn Jackson 8 years 
"That subsequent to the making of said will, 
one of the above named children, Fanny Jackson, 
a daughter, died and that the heirs of the said 
deceased consist of the said above named living 
children and that by reason thereof this plaintiff 
is entitled to recover the interest of said deceased 
child subject to the probate of this court, for the 
benefit of the living childr.en of this plaintiff and 
said John Jackson, deceased, and this action is 
prosecuted in behalf of the heirs· of said estate 
as shown by the aforesaid will, Exhibit 3." (R. 
page 4). 
Lillian Jackson, the plaintiff, is the mother 
of Fanny Jackson, deceased, and as such she is 
one of her heirs at law, if not the sole heir at law of 
said Fanny Jackson, deceased. As such heir at law, 
the plaintiff is directly interested in any recovery 
made in this action- against the Estate of John 
Jackson, deceased. 
We, therefore, conclude that Lillian Jackson, 
the plaintiff, is an incompetent witness for two 
reasons under the Utah Dead Man Statute: 
1. Because she is a party to the action, and 
2. Because she is a person directly inter-
ested in the event thereof. 
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Objections (2) and (3) to the testimony of Lillian 
Jackson, above set forth, will be argued together as the 
same law and reasoning applies to both. This is an action 
to enforce an alleged oral contract claimed to have been 
made on the 22nd day of April 1918, at Orland, Glenn 
County, State of California, between the p2aintiff and 
John Jackson. Plaintiff claims that under said alleged 
oral contract, John Jackson agreed to make a will and be-
queath to his seven children the sum of $3,500.00 each. 
The California Courts have construed Section 1973, Cal-
ifornia Code of Civil Procedure and Section 1624, Civil Code 
of California many times. In the case of Bogan vs .. Wiley, 
decided January 14, 1946, 164 Pac. (2d) 912, at page 914, 
the Court says : 
"There is no merit in the appeal and hence 
the judgment must be affirmed upon the rules of 
law so well settled that a brief reference to the 
decisions will suffice. 
" ( 1) The code sections declare that an oral 
contract to devise or bequeath property by will 
is invalid. Since their enactment our decisions 
have consistently held that such contracts are un-
enforceable, Hagan v. McNary, 170 Cal. 141, 144, 
148 P. 937, L.R.A. 1915E, 562; Trout v. Ogilvie, 
41 Cal. App. 167, 173, 182, P. 333; De Mattos v. 
McGovern 25 Cal. App. 2d 429, 432, 77 P. 2d 522; 
Zaring v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 2d 227, 231, 106 P. 
2d 224; Smith v. Bliss, 44 Cal. App. 2d 171, 175, 
112 P. 2d 30; Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal. 2d 334, 341, 
84 P. 2d 146; Rotea v. Izuel, 14 Cal. 2d 605, 607, 
95 P. 2d 927, 125 A.L.R. 1424." 
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The Supreme Court of California in the case of Giles 
vs. Reed, 186 Pac. 614, reading from page 615, states: 
"The chief error urged by appellant is pre-
dicted upon the ruling of the court in sustaining 
defendant's objections to questions whereby it 
was sought to elicit testimony tending to prove 
that deceased in her lifetime orally agreed with 
plaintiff, for the consideration named, to make 
a will devising to her the real estate described in 
the complaint. That the alleged contract was 
invalid, by reason of there being no note or mem-
orandum in writing and subscribed by deceased 
admits of no question (Subdivision 7 § 1624, Civil 
Code); hence there was no error in the ruling." 
In the case of Stevenson vs. PantaJ.eone, 21 Pac. (2d) 
703 (Cal) one of the objections upon which the offered 
testimony vvas excluded was based upon Section 1624 of 
the Civil Code and the obj e~tion was also predicated on 
Section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure above men-
tioned. The above court reading from page 706 says: 
"The ruling of the court sustaining the ob-
Jections to the offered evidence was correct, be-
cause the agreement was not in writing." 
The a:bove cases and the many other cases cited in 
our brief seem to us to be conclusive that the testimony 
of Lillian Jackson was also barr-ed by the two s.ections of 
the California Code above mentioned, and that the obj ec-
tions made to said testimony as set forth in (2) and (3) 
above are well taken, and should be sustained. 
(4) The testimony offered by Lillian Jackson was an 
attempt to alter, vary, contradict, ·change and add to the 
terms of a written instrument. The objection to her tes-
timony should also be sustained on this ground. 
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The plaintiff bring·s this action to recover for the 
breach of an alleged oral contract to make a will entered 
into by the plaintiff with John Jackson, now deceased, on 
the 22nd day of April, 1918. Plaintiff claims that prior to, 
contemporaneously with and at the sa~me time that the 
written agreement of April 22, 1918, was entered into, de-
cedent orally agreed that he would make a will in which 
he would bequeath to each of his children, the issue of the 
marriage of the plaintiff and said decedent, the sum of 
$3500.00. Nothing is said in the written agreement, how-
ever, about this alleged oral agreement on the part of the 
decedent to make said will leaving to the children the 
sum of $3500.00 each. The testimony offered by the plain-
tiff as a witness to prove this oral contract is in direct 
conflict with the written agreement entered into between 
the plaintiff and her ex-husband, the dec-edent. The writ-
ten agreement is fully set forth in the Findings of Fact 
(R. Page 124 to 130). The plaintiff pleaded this very 
agreement and expressly made this written agreement a 
part of her complaint. (R. Page 2). The defendant ad-
mitted the making and entering into of said written agree-
ment. 
There IS no ambiguity whatsoever in this written 
agreement. It is clear, concise, specific and needs no ex-
planation. It sets forth the entire agreement. Th·ere is 
no fraud or mistake alleged, and none proved. Plaintiff in 
said written agreement agreed with the decedent that she 
would bring up and support the children for the consider-
ation of a property s·ettlement of the approximate value 
of $28,689.00, which sum she received in full in 1918. Now, 
approximately 32 years after the making and entering into 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
of said written agreement, solemnly made and sworn to 
by the plaintiff, and after the death of the dec-edent, she 
comes into this Court and tries to tell this Court that at 
the time of the making and entering into of said written 
agreement it was also orally agreed that Mr. Jackson 
agreed with her in consideration of her taking care of the 
children which she had already agreed to do, that he would 
make a will and bequeath to the children the sum of $3500 
each. This is in direct contradiction to the explicit terms 
and provisions of the written agreement of April 22, 1918, 
·and is an attempt to alter, vary, contradict, change and 
add to the terms of said written agreement. 
Parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, 
add to or subtract from the terms of a written instrument 
and the evidence in this case does not come within any of 
the exceptions to the above mentioned general rule. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Starley et. 
al. vs. Deseret Foods Corporation et al, 7 4 Pac. (2d) 1221, 
reading from page 1224, states: 
"Courts have been quite ready to open the 
case to parol evidence to explain the intention of 
the maker where there is anything on the face of 
the note giving rise to ambiguity. This view is 
well indicated by the cases cited by appellant. But 
where there is no ambiguity, the rule will not be 
relaxed. The intention of the parties must be 
gathered from the instrument itself. Any other 
rule would tend to destroy the value of written 
instruments.. (Citing cases)''. 
The Court at page 1224 also states: 
"This court has many tim·es held that in the 
absence of fraud, mistake, or ambiguity parol evi-
dence is inadmissible to vary or explain the terms 
of a written instrument. (Citing cases)" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
In the case of Combined Metals, Inc., et al. vs. Bas-
tian, et al, 267 Pac. 1020 (Utah), the Court, reading from 
page 1027, states: 
" - - - When the testimony of such additional 
oral agreement was offered, Bastian's objections 
thereto were overruled. We think the court 
erred in the ruling. The doctrine is familiar that 
when parties put their negotiations into writing, 
in such terms as import a legal obli:sation, and on 
its face a completed contract, without any uncer-
tainty as to the object or extent of the engage-
ment, it is conclusively presumed that the whole 
of the engagement of the parties and the extent 
and manner of their undertaking have been re-
duced to writing, and that parol evidence is not 
admissible to vary or contradict the terms of 
such writing or add or substitute new or diff.2rent 
or additional terms. (Citing cases)" 
We could cite many more Utah cases, but we feel that 
the above cases are sufficient on this subject. The obj ec-
tion to plaintiff's testimony should also be sustained on this 
ground. 
(5) That plaintiff's amended Complaint fails to state 
a claim against the defendant upon which relief can be 
granted. We have heretofore argued this matter at Page 
12 to 15 of our brief and we believe from what we have 
there said, that this objection is also well taken. 
We believe that from what we have said, and the 
authorities in supj)Ort thereof, that we have successfully 
answered all of the arguments raised by plaintiff in her 
brief and designated as plaintiff's Point 1, (a), (b), (c) 
and (d). 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE 
EVIDENCE OF: 
(B). THE TESTIMONY OF KNOX PATTERSON. 
At the time of the trial of this action Knox Patterson, 
who was one of the attorneys for the plaintiff during the 
trial of the case before the District Judge and who is also 
attorney for the plaintiff on this appeal, took the stand 
as a witness to testify for and on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Mr. Patterson attempted to testify ( 1) as to conversations 
which he had with John Jackson and Lillian Jackson in his 
office at Moab, Utah, on or about the month of June, 1917, 
relative to a divorce action which he was filing for and on 
behalf of Lillian Jackson and a proposed property settle-
ment between these two people and (2) as to a conversa-
tion had in 1920 with John Jackson at Patterson's law of-
fice at Moab, Utah, at which time John Jackson had Knox 
Patterson prepare his will dated September 7, 1920, (Pl. 
Ex. I) and at which time it is claimed he (Jackson) told 
Patterson that he was preparing said will pursuant to an 
alleged oral promise he had made to Lillian Jackson at 
Orland, California, to the effect that he (Jackson) would 
will each of the seven children of John and Lillian Jackson 
the sum of $3,500.00 if Lillian Jackson would execute the 
said written agreement of April 22, 1918. Defendant ob-
jected to the testimony of Mr. Patterson upon the follow-
ing grounds : 
(1) That it was heresay, immaterial, irrelevant and 
incompetent. (R. Page 176). 
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(2) That under the provisions of Section 1973, C~ali­
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, an agreement which by its 
terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the 
promisor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any prop-
erty or to make any provision for any person by will is 
invalid and unenforceable unless the same or some note 
or memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed by 
the party to be charged or by his agent and evidence 
therefore of the agreement can not be received without 
the writing or secondary evidence of its contents. (R. 
pages 180 and 183). 
(3) That under the provisions of Section 1624, Civil 
Code of California, an agreement which by its terms is 
not to be performed during the lifetime of the promissor, 
or an agreement to devise or bequeath any property or to 
make any provision for any person by will is invalid and 
unenforceable unless the same or some note or mernoran-
dum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to 
be charged or his agent. (R. page·s 180 and 183). 
(4) That the testimony of Knox Patterson is an at-
tempt to alter, vary, contradict and change the contents 
of a written instrument, to wit: the will dated Septem-
ber 7, 1920 (Pl. E.x. I), also found in the Findings of the 
Court, (R. Pages, 138-140). Our objection is found at R. 
page 183. 
(5) That Knox Patterson is an incompetent witness 
under the provisions of Section 104-49-3 (2) Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, now being Section 104-24-8 (2) of the 
Judicial Code, Laws of Utah, 1951. (R. pages 180-183). 
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Plaintiff in her brief at pages 28 to 32 inclusive, dis-
cusses the question as to whether or not Knox Patterson 
may testify in this action but she disregards entirely all 
of the objections made to the testimony of Knox Patterson 
except one, which is objection marked (5) above. 
In substance, the same objections made to the testi-
mony of Knox Patterson were made to the testimony of 
Lillian Jackson during the trial. We have devoted consid-
erable space in this brief to the proposition that Lillian 
Jackson cannot testify for the reason that her testimony 
would alter, vary, contradict and change the said written 
instrument of April 22, 1918, entered into between Lillian 
and John Jackson, and for the same reason the testimony 
of Knox Patterson cannot be admitted -to vary, contra-
dict, add to or change the plain terms of the will of Sep-
tember 7, 1920, and would circumvent the provisions of 
Section 1973, California Code of Civil Procedure and Sec-
tion 1624 of Civil Code of California, which are the identi-
cal objections made to the testimony of Knox Patterson 
as set forth in paragraphs (2), (3) and ( 4) above. As 
the same rules apply to the objections made to the admis-
sion of the testimony of Knox Patterson as do to the admis-
sions of the testimony of Lillian Jackson, we shall not cite 
authorities here in support of our position that the testi-
mony of Knox Patterson was properly objected to on. the 
grounds as stated in paragraphs (2), (3) and ( 4) above, 
but we do refer this court to that portion of our brief at 
pages 39 to 43 which covers this subject as it relates 
to the testimony of Lillian Jackson and which is likewise 
controlling as to the objections raised to the testimony of 
Knox Patterson. 
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Section 104-49-3 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
now Section 104-24-8 (2) of our Judicial Code, Laws of 
Utah, 1951, reads in part as follows: 
"Privileged Communications. 
'~There are particular relations in which it 
is the policy of the law to encourage confidence 
and to preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a person 
can not be examinPd a~ a witness in the follow-
ing cases: 
"(2) An attorney can not, without the con-
sent of his client, be examined as to any com-
munication made by the client to him, or his ad-
vice given therein, in the course of professional 
employment; nor can an attorney's secretary, 
stenographer or clerk be examined, without the 
consent of his employer, concerning any fact, the 
knowledge of which has been acquired in such ca-
pacity.'' 
Plaintiff did not at the trial nor does she in her brief 
contend that Mr. Patterson was not the attorney for John 
Jackson at the time he drew the will of September 7, 1920, 
(Pl. Ex. I.) and at which time the said conversations be-
tween Knox Patterson and John Jackson took place. 
In connection with Mr. Patterson's employment as an 
attorney for John Jackson, we quote from his testimony 
given at the trial of this case: 
"Q. Were you acquainted with John Jackson, 
during his lifetime? 
"A y es. 
"Q Did you do legal services for him? 
"A Yes, time and again. 
"Q Did you also do legal services for Lillian Jack-
son? 
"A Yes, she and her husband together. 
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"Q Over how many years? 
"A It would run from 1909 until 1925, I would 
say so far as John is concerned. 
"Q And were you on a retainer basis during that 
time? 
"A N o, never. 
"The Court. Did you draw the will for him at 
that time? 
"A y . es, s1r. 
"The Court. Did he pay you for that service? 
"A I don't know, I can't remember about that but 
he did not pay me for the divorce, because he 
thought I hadn't given him a fair deal and 
that I had sided in with his wife. 
"The Court. You acted for him as his attor-
ney? 
"A I acted for his wife, as her attorney, be-
because, he told me that she had said that she 
wanted Knox Patterson to draw the will." (R. 
Pages 17 4 and 186). 
The trial court also found in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law the following: 
"That from 1909 to 1925, Knox Patterson rep-
resented the plaintiff and decedent, John Jack-
son, as an attorney at law at various times with 
no retainer fee from either at any time; that on 
September 7, 1920, John Jackson went to the law 
offices of Patterson and Constantine in Moab, 
Utah, and had them draft the will dated Septem-
ber 7, 1920, and which is set forth in full above, 
which will be duly executed; that Patterson and 
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Constantine mailed a copy of said will to Belle 
Dennis, the oldest daughter of John Jackson, who 
was named in said will as executrix thereof and 
in said letter of transmittal, Patterson and Con-
stantine stated that they had prepared it for her 
father, John Jackson, and were mailing it to 
her at his request. John Jackson sealed the ori-
ginal will in an envelope and filed it with the 
County Clerk of Grand county, Utah, and said en-
velope contains the written and printed material 
set forth above in these Findings." (R. pages 148 
and 149) . (For letter of transmittal of will see 
(Plaintiff's Ex. H). 
There can be no question from the testimony given 
by Mr. Patterson at the trial, the letter Ex. H, and the 
finding of the Court, above quoted, that an attorney-
client relationship was established between John Jackson 
and Knox Patterson at the time Mr. Patterson drew the 
will for John Jackson on September 7, 1920. 
The case of State vs. Snowden, 23 Utah 318, 65 P. 479 
(1901), was one in which the defendant was tried for the 
crime of adultery and in the course of the trial, o'bj ection 
was made to statements made by the defendant to his at-
torney about the alleged crime on the grounds that they 
were privileged under the Utah statute and that the at-
torney therefore could not testify. Our Court, in dis.cuss-
ing this question and also the question of whether an at-
torney-client relationship had been established between 
the defendant and the attorney sought to be questioned, 
said: 
" * * 'Whatever facts, therefore, are commu-
nicated by client to counsel solely on account of 
that relation, such counsel are not at liberty, 
even if they wish, to disclose ; and the law holds 
their testimony incompetent.' In the late case 
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of Bruley v. Garvin (Wis.) 81 N.W. 1038, it is 
held not to be 'absolutely essential that a fee 
should be paid, or that there should be an ac-
tual retainer,' and that it is sufficient if the 
attorney's legal advice was sought for and he 
could be considered for the time being the le-
gal adviser of the other. Supporting the same 
rule is Jones, Ev. § 767, and cases cited. The 
protection of the statute applies to conversations 
with the attorney in negotiating to em p 1 o y 
him. It may be necessary to disclose to the a ttor-
ney many confidential matters connected with 
the case before it is determined whether a re-
tainer will be given or accepted. Of course, a dif-
ferent rule would apply to communications made 
to the attorney after he had informed the person 
that no employment would or could be accepted. 
Nelson v. Becker (Neb.) 48 N.W. 962, cited with 
approval in Farley v. Peebles. (Neb.) 70 N.W. 231. 
In Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394, 36 Am. Rep. 
627, the attorney divided his attentions between 
the bar of justice and the bar of Bacchus. While 
presiding at the latter place, a former client, in 
the presence of several others, but perhaps not in 
their hearing, submitted a hypothetical proposi-
tion to the attorney at the bar. No fee was paid, 
neither was a suit pending nor contemplated. In 
a suit afterwards brought between third parties, 
the court held the saloon conversation privileged, 
because it appeared from all the facts that it was 
a confidential communication in the course of 
professional employment. It is there said: 'All 
communications made by a client to his counsel 
for the purpose of professional advice or assist-
ance are privileged, whether they relate to a suit 
pending or .contemplated, or to any other matter 
proper for such advise or aid,' -citing Britton v. 
Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51; Turquand v. Knight, 2 Mees. 
& W. 98. See, also, Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 551; 
Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Ba:vb. Ch. 595, 49 Am. Dec. 
189; Green 1 Ev. (15th Ed.) § 240. The underly-
ing principle of the rule, as stated in the New 
York case first above cited, is 'that he who seeks 
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aid or advice from a lawyer ought to be altogeth-
er free from the dread that his secrets will be un-
covered, to the end that he may speak freely and 
fully all that is on his mind.' In 19 Ves. 267, Lord 
Eldon expressed the thought that one way of pre-
venting an attorney who had changed his rela-
tions with his client from testifying against his 
client 'would be by striking him off the roll.' The 
following quotations in State v. Dawson (Mo. 
Sup.) 1 S.W. 829, from the opinions of Lord 
Brougham, illustrate the importance and purpose 
of the rule: 'The foundation of this rule is not 
on account of any particular importance which 
the law attributes to the business of the legal pro-
fessors, or any particular disposition to afford 
them protection; but it is out of regard to the 
interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, 
and to the administration of justice, which can-
not go on, without the aid of men skilled in juris-
prudence, in the practice of the courts, and in 
matter affecting rights and obligations which 
form the subject of all judicial proceedings.' 
Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Mylne & K. 98. If such 
communications are not protected, no man would 
dare consult a professional adviser with a view 
to his defense or to the enforcement of his rights, 
and no man could safely come into court . either 
to obtain redress or to defend himself.' Bolton v. 
Liverpool ·Corp., 3 Sim. 467. 
"It is evident from an inspection of the record 
that the trial court attached much importance to 
the question of whether there was an absolute 
contract of employment. The trial court conceded, 
in fact, that a conditional employment was prov-
ed, and that the appearance for Miss Keeler 
was upon the employment of the defendant. Un-
due importance seems to have been attached to 
the fact that the attorney had not appeared of 
record for the defendant. Greater weight seems 
to have been given to the opinion of the attorney 
that the conversation with him was not in profes-
sional confidence than to all the surrounding cir-
cumstances showing that such must have been 
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the case. Upon the entire record, if not alone upon 
the undisputed facts as testified to by the attor-
ney, it is evident that such relations existed be-
tween the attorney and defendant as to make the 
communication in question privileged. The con-
clusion upon all the testimony is irresistible that 
a close confidence existed between the parties, 
and that the defendant made the statement in 
confidence to a person whom he regarded, and 
had reason to regard, as his attorney in the case 
at bar. In support hereof, also, see Tramway Co. 
v. Owens (Colo. Sup.) 36 Pac. 848; Davis v. Mor-
gan (Mont.) 47 Pac. 793; Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa. 
519; Benedict v. State (Ohio Sup.) 11 N.E. 125; 
Basye v. State (Neb.) 63 N.W. 811; Perry v. 
State (Idaho) 38 Pac. 655 (dissenting opinion)." 
Defendant in her brief cites In re Young's E·state, 33 
Utah 382, 94 P. 731 (1908), in support of her argument 
that the privilege under the statute does not apply to Mr. 
Patterson. That case, however, is not in point for it in-
volved a will contest and our court, in what is generally 
recognized as the universal rule, held that the privilege 
did not extend to will contests as such cases come within 
the exceptions to the general rule. 
Defendant also cites the case of Anderson vs. Thomas, 
108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142, (1945). That case is not in 
point. Our Supreme Court in the above case, held as 
follows: 
"We conclude that all of the testimony given 
by J. S. Christensen, attorney for Mrs. Thomas, 
was properly admitted either (1) as having been 
related to communications given in the presence 
of third parties; (2) as relating to the execution 
of the deed to which he was an attesting witness; 
or (3) as not being a communication in the course 
of professional employment which M-rs. Thomas 
desired to have confidential." 
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It is evident from reading the testimony of Mr. Pat-
terson in the case at bar, that none of the three exceptions 
quoted above from the case of Anderson vs. Thomas, ap-
ply in the instant case. Mr. Patterson received the com-
munications upon which he is attempting to testify in the 
course of professional employment and they were not giv-
en in the presence of third parties. It m us,t be admitted 
that Mr. Patterson was a witness to the will but as this 
is not a will contest but an action to recover under a con-
tract, the privilege can not be waived. 
Defendant also cites Webb vs. Webb, Utah (1949), 
209 P. 2d 201. This case is not in point for the reason that 
the court held that the conversation was admissible under 
one of the exceptions to the rule whereas in the case at 
bar, no contention is made that the conversation between 
Mr. Patterson and his client, John Jackson, came within 
any of the exceptions to the rule adopted in this state un-
der said Section 104-24-8 (2) of our Judicial Code. 
The case of Carey vs. Powell, 32 Wash. 2d 761, 204 
P. 2d 193 (1949), is also cited by plaintiff in support of 
her contention that Knox Patterson should be permitted 
to testify. A reading of this case discloses that the attor-
ney who drew up the will and contract upon which the ac-
tion for specific performance was based was, according to 
his testimony, performing services for the testatrix and 
her daughter and that the conversation was had in his 
office in the presence of the testatrix, her daughter and 
the daughter's husband, and the court held that under 
such circumstances, the rule of privilege did not apply as 
to the testimony surrounding the execution of the will and 
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the contract. In passing, we call to the coui't's attention 
that in that case as soon as the case of In re Torstensen' s 
E·state, 28 Wash. 2d 837, 184 P. 2d 255, was called to the 
attention of the attorney, he withdrew from the case be-
cause of professional ethics. There has been no withdraw-
al of the attorney in the case at bar. In the case at bar, 
no one was present at the time of the alleged conversation 
between Knox Patterson and his client, John Jackson, 
other than Mr. Patterson's law partner, George J. Con-
stantine, who was one of the attesting witnesses to the 
will and so plaintiff can not rely upon the authority of 
Carey vs. Powell as in that case the conversation was 
had in the presence of two other persons and there was 
some question as to whether the attorney who drew the 
will and contract had been employed by the testatrix, 
whose representatives raised the question of privilege. 
As this is an action by Lillian Jackson to recover the 
sum of $24,500.00 from the estate of John Jackson, the tes-
timony of Knox Patterson to the effect that John Jackson 
told him that he had made an oral agreement with Lillian 
J·ackson to will to each of their children the sum of $3,500.00 
or a total of $24,500.00, would, if permitted to be intro-
duced, defeat the very relationship between attorney and 
client for which said Section 104-24-8 (2), Judicial Code, 
was enacted, namely, for the purpose of encouraging con-
fidence and preserving inviolate the relationship between 
attorney and his client. The statute says "An attorney 
cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as 
to any communication made by the client to him, * * in 
the course of his professional employment; * * . " (Em-
phasis ours). In this case neither the consent of John Jack-
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son nor his legal reprsentative was obtained to permit 
Knox Patterson to testify as to the conversation which he 
had with John Jackson in September of 1920. And we sub-
mit that the evidence at the trial conclusively shows that 
an attorney-client relationship existed between Patterson 
and Jackson at the time Patterson was employed to draw 
the will of John Jackson of September 7, 1920. Plaintiff 
has failed to show that the testimony of Patterson falls 
within any of the recognized exceptions to the general 
rule of privileged communications between client and at-
torney. 
The defendant may contend that the conversation did 
not take place in the course of professional employment. 
John Jackson went to Knox Patterson for the express pur-
pose of having his will prepared by Patterson, who had 
been his attorney since 1909. It is hard to conceive that 
he went to the office of Patterson and ~Constantine after 
his return to Moab in 1920, at the mere suggestion of his 
former wife, Lillian Jackson, from whom he had been di-
vorced. The fact that Lillian Jackson had said she wanted 
Knox Patterson to draw up the will did not do away with 
the relationship of attorney and client created between 
Jackson and Patterson and thus cause a waiver of the priv-
ilege, for if such relationship is done away with by the 
mere suggestion or recommendation of someone as to the 
attorney he should consult with, it would lead to the very 
destruction of the policy of confidence which the law at-
tempts to preserve and encourage between an attorney and 
his client. There is nothing in the records to show that 
Lillian Jackson had employed Knox Patterson to represent 
her at the time the will was prepared, nor does it disclose 
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that she had any conversation whatsoever with Patterson 
relative to the preparation of the will in 1920, nor was 
Lillian Jackson present at the time the will was prepared. 
The voluntary employment of an attorney is not essential 
to render confidential communications between attorney 
and client becoming privileged. Jayne vs. Bateman, 191 
Okla. 272, 129 P. 2d 188 (1942). 
No one was present at the time the alleged conversa-
tion took place other than John Jackson and Knox Patter-
son, and George J. Constantine, Mr. Patterson's law part-
ner, who signed the will as a witness and, of course, the 
privilege would extend to Mr. Constantine, if he heard the 
conversation, by virtue of his being a law partner of Mr. 
Patterson. 
"A valid contract of partnership may be 
made between two or more duly· qualified attor-
neys, but not between an attorney and a person 
not admitted to practice. A firm of law practi-
tioners, as such, are regarded as a single entity 
and the general principles of the law of partner-
ship apply to lawyers with the same force that 
they do to partnerships engaged in other occupa-
tions or professions. 
"In the absence of a special agreement, each 
member of the firm assumes the duty of giving 
to its business all of his time, skill, and ability, 
as far as reasonably necessary to the success of 
the common enterprise, and, consequently, in the 
absence of an express agreement to the contrary 
any professional services rendered by a member 
of a firm of lawyers will be presumed to be for 
the benefit of the firm. * * * 
"The acts and admissions of one member of 
a firm, made in relation to and in the course of 
the regular business of the firm, are binding on 
the firm. * * * " 7 C.J .S. Page 838 ~ 56. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 
A case which is frequently cited with approval as 
authority as to what constitutes "professional employ-
ment", is Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo. 107, 36 
P. 848 (1894). This case is cited with approval by our Su-
preme Court in State vs. Snowden, supra. Justice Elliott, 
speaking for the Colorado Supreme Court in that case, 
said: 
"To constitute professional employment, it 
is not essential that the client should have em-
ployed the attorney professionally on any prev-
ious occasion. Such a limitation of the rule would 
bear hard upon a person involved in legal contro-
versy for the first time, and also upon an attorney 
with his first cause. It is not necessary that any re-
tainer should have been paid, promised, or 
charged for; nor are such matters of any impor-
tance except as they may tend to show whether 
the attorney was or was not professionally em-
ployed. Neither is it material that there was a 
suit pending at the time of the consultation, nor 
that the attorney consulted did not afterwards 
undertake the case about which the consultation 
was had. If a person in respect to his business 
affairs, or troubles of any kind, consults with an 
attorney in his professional capacity, with the 
view to obtaining professional advice or assist-
ance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or ac-
quiesces in such consu~tation, then the profes-
sional employment must be regarded as estab-
lished, and the communication made by the· client, 
or advice given by the attorney, under such cir-
cumstances is privileged. An attorney is em-
ployed - that is, he is engaged in his professional 
capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is 
listening to his client's preliminary statement of 
his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just 
as truly as when he is drawing his client's plead-
ings, or advocating his client's cause in open 
court. It is the consultation between attorney 
~nd client which is privileged, and which must 
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ever remain so, even though the attorney, after 
hearing the preliminary statement, should decline 
to be retained further in the cause, or the client, 
after hearing the attorney's advice, should decline 
to further employ him. The general rule un-
doubtedly is that a breach of professional rela-
tions between attorney and client, whatever may 
be the cause, does not of itself remove the seal 
of silence from the lips of the attorney in respect 
to matters received by him in confidence from 
his client. Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89; Hunter v. 
Van Bornhorst, 1 Md. 504; Cross v. Riggins, 50 
Mo. 335. In this case, it appears that the con-
ductor, Evans, was present at the conversation 
between Mr. Mead and the plaintiff. It does not 
appear whether he heard or participated in such 
conversation, nor is it material whether he did or 
did not. The rule excluding the attorney from 
testifying did not extend to Evans, and there is 
no reason why he might not have been required 
to state the conversation, if he heard it. But the 
fact that E.vans might have testified did not make 
the attorney a competent witness without his 
client's consent. The statute contains no such 
exceptions, nor was the consultation held in the 
presence of opposing parties, or of all parties in-
terested. It does not appear that Evans represent-
ed any party in interest, or anybody at all, for 
that matter. Rex v. Brewer, 6 ~Car. & P. 363." 
At page 28 of plaintiff's brief, appears this statement: 
"It will be observed that counsel for the de-
fendant made no objections to the testimony of 
the attorney who ·drew the will of 1920 on the 
ground of professional ethics, * * * ". 
This is true. Defendant did not object at the trial of 
this case to the testimony of Mr. Patterson, the attorney 
who prepared the will and also the attorney who repres.ent-
ed the plaintiff at the trial of this case and who also rep-
resents plaintiff on this appeal, on the ground of profes-
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sional ethics. Defendant left the matter of whether Mr. 
Patterson should or should not testify in this action on 
the grounds of professional ethics entirely up to Mr. Pat-
terson. He chose to testify. As to whether it was proper 
for Mr. Patterson to testify, defendant calls the attention 
of this court to the discussion of this rna tter in the case 
of In re Tortensen's Estate 28 Wash. 2d 837, 184 P. 2d 
255, at pages 270 and 271 (1947). 
It is also well settled that the termination of the re-
lationship of attorney and client does not affect the pro-
tection given by the law to communications made in con-
fidence during existence of the relation, the. rule being 
that the privilege, when once attached, continues at least 
during the lifetime of the client, unless waived by him. 5 
A.L.R. 730, Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, (1894) 20 
Colo. 107, 36 P. 848, Hardy vs. Martin, (1907) 150 Cal. 341, 
89 P. 111. 
In the annotation in 64 A.L.R., pages 192 to 194, is 
found the following: 
"***And where the attorney who drew the 
will is requested by the testator to become a sub-
scribing witness thereto, it has been held that 
there is an express waiver of the privilege within 
statutory provisions, although the waiver does 
not permit the attorney to give testimony which 
would vary the terms o! the will. * * * But while 
a testa tor waives the seal of confidence by re-
questing his attorney to witness his will, it seems 
that he may annul such waiver by revoking the 
will, so that the attorney will not thereafter be per-
mitted to testify as to its execution and instructions 
given by the testator respecting the will. * * * *" 
" * * That, however, no such presumption as 
to waiver arises so as to permit the attorney to 
testify to facts which vary the terms of the will 
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prepared by him, and that in a proceeding to 
construe the will, the attorney with whom the 
testator consulted concerning it is not competent 
to testify concerning a communication made to 
him by his client touching his estate, the objects 
of his bounty, or the meaning or effect of provis-
ions contained in the will. Knepper v. Knepper 
(1921) 103 Ohio St. 529, 134 N.E. 476." 
The case at bar does not involve a will contest. Most 
of the cases cited by plaintiff involve a will contest. The 
will of September 7, 1920, prepared by the law firm of 
Patterson and Constantine, was revoked by John Jackson's 
will of December 9, 1946. The latter will is the will ad-
mitted to probate in Grand county, Utah. It therefore 
seems clear from the above authorities., that even if the 
case at bar were a will contest case, that Patterson would 
not be allowed to testify because the waiver of the confi-
dence which Patterson obtained when he was requested 
to witness the will of September 7, 1920, was annulled by 
the will of December 9, 1946, because said will revoked 
the will of September 7, 1920. 
The testator's intention is to be ascertained from the 
words of the will. See Section 101-2-2 Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1943. 
There can be no doubt that if Knox Patterson is per-
mitted to testify that it would tend to do injury to the 
estate of his former client, John Jackson; and the law, as 
we read and understand it, will not permit an attorney to 
take advantage of his position to the detriment and injury 
of a client. John Jackson by his will of December 9, 1946, 
provided for his wife, Sinda Jackson, and all of his child-
ren, both those out of his marriage with Lillian J a.ckson 
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and Sinda Jackson. If the last desires of John Jackson 
can now be set aside through evidence of his former attor-
ney, obtained in the course of professional employment 
some 32 years ago, what protection then is left to the pub-
lic dealing with members of the legal profession? How 
did Knox Patterson obtain the alleged facts upon which 
he now seeks to testify? Only through his acting for and 
being employed as the attorney for John Jackson. On this 
subject the Supreme Court of Kansas in Sheehan v. Allen, 
67 Kan. 712, 7 4 P. 245 (1903) in holding that two attor-
neys were incompetent to testify said: 
"In this case, however, it is quite clear the 
witnesses would not have learned the major por-
tion of the facts which they disclosed, or held the 
most important conversations which they repeat-
ed on the witness stand, had they not undertaken 
to consult with and act for Richard Collins as his 
attorneys. This being true, they were incompe-
tent to testify as to such facts. and conversations. 
Without these, they were not qualified to speak 
upon the question of Richard Collins' sanity; and, 
since their observations should have preceded 
their opinions (Baughman v. Baughman, 32 Kan. 
538, 4 Pac. 1003), their testimony should have 
been excluded." 
"The absence of the privilege would convert 
the attorney habitually and inevitably into a 
mere informer for the benefit of the opponent." 
8 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed. Sec. 2380a, P. 813. 
City and County of San Francisco v. Superior 
Court, Cal. (1951), 231 P. 2d 26. 
" 'Truth, like. all other good things, may be 
loved unwisely, may be pursued too keenly, may 
cost too much; and surely the meanness and the 
mischief of prying into a man's confidential con-
sulations with his legal adviser, the general evil 
of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, 
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suspicion, and fear into those communications 
which must take place, and which, unless in a 
condition of perfect security, must take place 
uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay 
for truth itself.' Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & Sm. 
25." (Cited in Sitton v. Peyree, 117 Or. 107, 24 _ 
P. 62.) 
And so we submit that the trial Judge did not err in 
sustaining the defendant's objections to the testimony of 
Knox Pa ttterson. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE 
EVIDE~N·CE OF: 
(C.) THERE WERE NO SEPARATE WRITINGS 
RELATING TO THE SAME SUBJECT WHICH COULD 
BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER TO BE ADMITTED. 
Counsel at page 24 of his brief, argues that separate 
writings relating to the same subject should be considered 
together. Plaintiff does not call our attention to any such 
writings. The only writing signed by John Jackson and 
relied upon by plaintiff in this case is· the will of John 
Jackson dated September 7, 1920, (Pl. Ex. I), and this 
writing is not of the class required to take the case out 
of the Statute of Frauds, as declared by the many authori-
ties hereinafter cited. The case of Ayoob vs. Ayoob, 1·68 P. 
2d 462, cited by counsel is not in point in this case because, 
in the Ayoob ease, there was a written memorandum of 
the alleged oral agreement. We desire to cite this court's 
attention to the case of In re Edwall's Estate 75 Wash. 
391, 134 P. 1041. This case fully discusses the difference 
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between agreement and a will, and fully disposes of all of 
the arguments made by counsel on this subject. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT MISCONTR.UE THE STAT-
UTE OF FRA DDS AND THE CONFLI~CT OF LAWS. 
The alleged oral agreement sought to be enforced in 
this action \Vas made and entered into April 22, 1918, at 
Orland, Glenn County, State of California. At the time 
said oral agreement was made, the parties were residents 
and citizens of California. Plaintiff is still a resident and 
citizen of California. Plaintiff seeks to enforce in the State 
of Utah said oral agreement which is invalid and unen-
forceable in the State of California. The question of con-
flict of laws dealing with the California Statute of Frauds 
is, therefore, one of the questions to be determined. Plain-
tiff claims that the alleged oral agreement made and en-
tered into in the State of California is not governed by the 
California Statute of Frauds. We claim the California 
Statute of Frauds is controlling and conclusive, and that 
the alleged oral agreement, invalid and unenforceable in 
California where made, is also invalid and unenforceable 
in the State of Utah, where said invalid agreement is 
sought to be enforced. 
We pleaded and proved as one of our defenses to the 
plaintiff's Complaint, Section 1973, California Code of 
Civil Procedure and Section 1624, Civil Code of California. 
Section 1973, California Code of Civil Procedure has 
been in full force and effect since the year 1907, and reads 
as follows: 
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"§1973. AGREE·ME.NTS NOT IN WRIT-
ING, WHEN INVALID. In the following cases 
the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some 
note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and 
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. 
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement, can not be 
received without the writing or secondary evidence 
of its contents: 
"1. An agreen1ent that by its terms is not 
to be performed. within a year from the making 
thereof; 
"2. A special promise to answer for the 
debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except 
in the cases provided for in section t,Nenty-seven 
hundred and ninety-four .of the Civil Code; 
"3. An agreement made upon consideration 
of marriage other than a mutual promise to 
marry; 
"4. An agreement for the sale of goods, 
chattels, or things in action, at a price not less 
than two hundred dollars, unless the buyer ac-
cepts or receives part of such goods and chattels 
or the evidences, or some of them, of such things 
in action, or pays at the same time .some part of 
the purchase-money; but when a sale is made at 
auction, an entry by the auctioneer in his sale-
book, at the time of the sale, of the kind of prop-
erty sold, the terms of the sale, the price, and. the 
names of the purchaser and person on whose ac-
count the sale is made, is a sufficient. memoran-
dum; 
"5. An agreement for the leasing for a 
longer period than one year, or for the sale of 
real property, or of an interest therein; and such 
agreement, if made by an agent of the party 
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the au-
thority of the· agent is in writing, subscribed by 
the party sought to be charged; 
"6. An agreement authorizing or employ-
ing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real 
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estate for compensation or a commission; 
"7. An agr~ement which by its terms is not 
to be performed during the lifetime of the prom-
isor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any 
property, or to make any provision for any person 
by will." 
Section 1624, Civil Code of California, has been in 
full force and effect since the year 1905, and reads as fol-
lows: 
"§1624.. WHAT CONTRACTS MUST BE 
IN WRITING. The following contracts are in-
valid, unless the same, or some note or memo-
randum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by 
the party to be charged, or by his agent: 
"1. An agreement that by its terms is not 
to be performed "\Vithin a year from the making 
thereof; 
"2. A special promise to ans~wer for the 
debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except 
in the cases provfded for in section twenty -seven 
hundred and ninety-four; 
"3. An agreement made upon consideration 
of marriage other than a mutual promise to 
marry; 
"4. An agreement for· the sale of goods, 
chattels, or things in action, at a price not less 
than two hundred dollars, unless the buyer ac-
cepts or receives part of such goods and chattels 
or the evidences, or some of them, of such things 
in action, or pays at the time some part of the 
purchase money; but when ·a sale is made at auc-
tion, an entry by the auctioneer in his sale book, 
at the time of the sale, of the kind of property 
sold, the terms of the sale, the price, and the 
names of the purchaser and person on whose ac-
count the sale is made, is a sufficient memoran-
dum; 
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"5. An agreement for the leasin ~ for a 
longer period than one year, or for the sale of real 
property, or of an interest therein; and such 
agreement, if made by an agent of the party 
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the au-
thority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by 
the party sought to be charged; 
"6. An agreement authorizing or employing 
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate 
for compensation or a commission; 
"7. An agreement which by its terms is not 
to be performed during the lifetime of the prom-
isor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any 
property, or to make any provision for any per-
son by will." 
Both of the above sections of the California Code 
were in full force and effect long prior to the time when 
the alleged oral agreement above mentioned was entered 
into at Orland, Glenn County, State of California, on April 
22, 1918. 
There is a hopeless conflict in the authorities on this 
question. We believe, however, that the weight of author-
ity and the best reasoned cases support the general rule 
that the construction and validity of a contract are gov-
erned by the law of the place where made, and that this 
includes the formality. or necessity of a written memo-
randum required by the Statute of Frauds. 
II Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Section 198, pages 514 
and 515, reads in part as follows: 
"D." STATUTE· OF FRAUD'S 
"§198. Generally.-The authorities are in 
· hopeless conflict as to the extent to which the 
principle that contracts valid or invalid by their 
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proper law are valid or invalid elsewhere applies 
to contracts unenforceable by reason. of the stat-
ute of frauds of the jurisdiction in which they 
are made and to be performed. In the application 
of the general rule that a contract invalid where 
made is unenforceable in another jurisdiction, 
though it would have been valid if there made, it 
has been held that an oral promise or contract, 
unenforceable in the jurisdiction where made, 
cannot be enforced in another jurisdiction though 
it would have been valid if there made. It has also 
been held that if the contract sought to be en-
forced was valid where made, it may be enforced 
in the jurisdiction of the forum though it would 
have been unenforceable if made in the latter jur-
isdiction. If the contract is unenforceable both by 
the statute of the state where it was made, which 
is proved, and by the statute of the state of the 
forum, there is no question that it will not be en-
forced in the latter jurisdiction." 
II Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Section 200, pages 518 
and 519, reads in part as follows.: 
" 
" - - - - - The modern trend supports the doc-
trine that rejects, so far as the conflict of laws 
is concerned, the distinction based on the pro-
cedural or substantive form of the provisions of 
the statute and regards them for such purpose as 
essentially substantive, irrespective of their 
form. Upon the assumption that the statute of 
frauds or a particular provision thereof relates 
to substance and not to procedure, the question 
arises whether the contract is governed in this 
respect by the law of the place where it was made 
or by the law of the place of performance, if the 
two differ. It seems to be held, in a majority of 
cases, that a contract, valid by the law of the 
place where it was made, will be enforced, al-
though contrary to the statute of frauds of. the 
place of performance. Conversely to the general 
rule, it has been held that a contract in violation 
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of the statute of frauds of the place where it was 
made will not be enforced, although valid accord-
ing to the law of the place of performance. - - - " 
In the case of Lams vs. F. H. Smith Company, 36 Del. 
4 77 ; 178 A. 651 ; 105 A. L. R. 646, reading from page 648, 
the court states : 
"Most of the American decisions discussing 
the nature and character of the Statute of 
Frauds, and especially in connection with the con-
flict of laws, may generally be divided into three 
groups: 
"(1) those that adopt the distinction laid 
down in Leroux v. Brown and hold the Statute 
remedial or procedural; 
"(2) those that repudiate the distinction 
yet still hold the Statute remedial; and 
"(3) those that repudiate the distinction 
and hold the Statute is substantive." 
The Court then continues and at page 649 of 105 A. 
L. R.. states : 
"In the third group holding that the Statute 
of Frauds should be construed as substantive and 
not procedural are many well reasoned cases sup-
ported by articles by leading educators. Halloran 
v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162 
N. W. 1082, L.R.A. 1917E, 777; Cochran v. Ward, 
5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N. E. 795, 31 N. E:. 581, 51 Am. 
St. Rep. 229; Matson v. Bauman, 139 Minn. 296, 
166 N. W. 343; Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 34 
N. E. 1111, 37 Am. St. Rep. 186; Goodrich, COn-
flict of Laws, §88; Restatement, Conflict of 
Laws, §334, "Statute of Frauds and the Conflict 
of Laws," 32 Yale Law Journal 311. See, also, as 
to Pennsylvania Act (33PS § 1 et seq.) being sub-
stantive, Franklin Sugar· Co. v. Martin-Nelly Co., 
94 W. Va. 504, 119 S. E. 473; Franklin Sugar R.e-
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fining Co. v. Holstein I-Iarvey's Sons (D. C.) 275 
F. 622; Franklin Sugar Co. v. \Villiam D. Mullen 
Co. (D. C.) 7 F. (2d) 470.'' 
"The principle that the construction and val-
idity of a contract are governed by the lavv of the 
place where it is made applies to the formality or 
necessity of a written memorandum required by 
the Statute of Frauds. Lams. v. F. H. Smith Co., 
105 A.L.R. 646, 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651, (Anno-
tated)." 
It certainly was not the intent of the California Legis-
lature in passing the above sections of the California Sta-
tute that its citizens (and both the plaintiff and the deceas-
ed, John Jackson, were at the time the alleged agreement 
was entered into citizens of the State of California, and the 
Plaintiff is still a citizen of c·alifornia) be harassed upon 
the contract and be faced by oral testimony if sued in the 
courts of another state. The Delaware Court speaking on 
this subject in the case of Lam·s vs. Smith, 105 A.L.R. 646, 
reading from pages 649 and 650, says: 
"The Delaware Statute of Frauds requiring an 
agreement not to be performed within a year to be 
evidenced by a memorandum in writing is primar-
ily for the benefit of the citizens of Delarawe. It 
was the agreement or contracts of Delawareans 
which were mainly sought to be protected from 
the future uncertainties of oral testimony and the 
Legislature was not merely laying down a rule of 
evidence for the Courts. If the necessity of writing 
be procedural then while the lack of writing would 
prevent the enforcement of the contract in the 
Courts of Delaware yet the Delaware citizen would 
still be liable to be harassed upon the contract and 
to be faced by oral testimony if sued in the ·Courts 
of another State, the Statute of which had been 
held to be substantive. On the other hand, if the 
necessity of writing be construed as one of the 
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formalities of the contract, then the absence of 
the writing would make the contract-not void-
but unenforceable in the Courts of Delaware, and, 
under principle of comity and conflict of laws, un-
enforceable outside of the State and insure to· the 
citizens for whose benefit the Act was passed the 
full measure of protection. Restatement, Conflict 
of Laws § 334." 
Speaking on this subject, the California Court in the 
case O'Brien vs. O'Bt:ien, 241 Pac. 861 (Cal.), reading from 
page 864, says: 
"It must be taken as the settled law in this 
state that by the amendment of 1905, adding sub-
division 7 to section 1624 of the Civil Code, and by 
the corresponding provision of subdivision 7 of 
section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure as 
amended in 1907, 'an agreement - - - to devise or 
bequeath any property, or to make any provision 
for any person by will' is invalid unless the same 
or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing 
and su'bscribed by the party to be charged or his 
agent. - - -
"The reason prompting the amendment of 
1905 is aptly stated by the Code Commission in his 
note appended to Section 1624 as follows: 
"'The change consists in the addition of sub-
division 7. The cases in which it (is) sought to 
establish by parol evidence alleged agreements to 
provide for a person by will are becoming so num-
erous as to warrant the assumption that the rea-
sons inducing the original enactment of the sta-
tute of frauds apply vvith especial force to agree-
ments of this class and that they ought to be 
brought within· that statute.' 
"Since that amendment, the effect of the new 
subdivison as applied to numerous and varying 
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states of facts has been before the courts, but no-
where has it been decided, . so far as vve are ad-
vised, that the amendment should not be given the 
same force and effect as other provisions of the 
statute of frauds. - - - " 
There is an exhaustive annotation of the cases on this 
point immediately following the recorded case of Lams 
vs. F. H. Smith Company, 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651; 105 A. 
L. R. 646. In analyzing the matters under discussion in this 
case the annotator in 105 A.L.R., reading from page 661, 
states: 
"In other words, the adoption either of the 
view that the essential character of the statute 
as substantive or procedural depends upon its 
form, or of the view that the statute, regardless 
of its form, is essentially procedural, leaves always 
open the possibility that the breath of life may be 
breathed into a contract that was stillborn tested 
by the law of the place where it was made, if the 
defendant is unwary enough to be caught, or to 
permit his property to be caught, in a jurisdiction 
whose statute is satisfied (a statute which pre-
sumably was entirely beyond the range of reason-
able contemplation of the parties at the time of 
their transaction) ; and, upon the other hand, 
leaves open the possibility of practically nullifying 
a contract valid and enforceable tested by the law 
of the place where it was made, if the party de-
siring to escape its burdens takes himself and his 
property to, and keeps them in, another j urisdic-
tion whose statute is not satisfied. Both of these 
possibilities are avoided by the adoption of the 
view that the Statute of Frauds, regardless of its 
form, is essentially substantive, unless in a partic-
ular instance the court regards it as contrary to 
the public policy of the forum to enforce a con-
tract that is valid tested by the law of the place 
where it was made, but which does not comply with 
the requirements of the local Statute of Frauds. 
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These realistic considerations against the procedu-
ral view of the statute as regards conflict of laws 
are forcibly presented.by the opinion in the LAMS 
CASE (Del.) (reported herewith) ante, 646." 105 
A.L.R., page 661. 
In the case of Johnson v. Allen, 158 Pac. (2d) 134 
(Utah), reading from page 138, the court states: 
"In making the argument that Idaho law 
should govern because the listing contract cover-
ed Idaho lands, the defendant fails to note the true 
nature of the contract involved. It does not purport 
to transfer an interest in Idaho land; rather it is 
a contract of employment. See Toomy v. Dunphy, 
86 Cal. 639, 25 P. 130; Kennedy v. Merickel, 8 Cal. 
App. 378, 97 P. 81; Callaway v. Prettyman, 218 Pa. 
293, 67 A. 418. Its validity is to be determined by 
the law of the place where the contract was made·. 
Callaway v. Prettyman, supra; Detroit & Cleveland 
Nav. Co. v. Hade, 106 Ohio St. 464, 140 N.E. 180; 
Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 33 S. 
Ct. 69, 57 L. Ed. 146; Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 
211, 45 N.E. 737, 36 L.R.A. 771, 57 Am. St. Rep. 
442; Story, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 262; Beale, Con-
flicts of Laws, Vol. II, pp. 1181, 1191. 
"In Callaway v. Prettyman, supra, the listing 
contract was made in Pennsylvania to sell real es-
tate situated in New Jersey. New Jersey law re-
quired the listing contract to be in writing and un-
der New Jersey law the contract would have ap-
parently been invaliid. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that 'the validity of the contract as af-
fected by the statute of frauds is c:ontrolled by 
the law of this state, and not by that of New Jer-
sey, and Callaway's contract of employment, made 
in this city, was valid, as the law of the place of 
making the contract governs as to the formali-
ties.' (218 Pa. 293, 67 A. 419). ·We conclude that 
the law of the place of the making governs the 
validity of the contract." 
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There is also a further annotation on this subject at 
161 A.L.R. 820. 
The oral contract was made and concluded in the State 
of California. The fact that John Jackson later at 
Moab, Utah, made a Will makes no difference to the situa-
tion in this case. He could have gone to any state of the 
Union and made a Will. A Will is ambulatory and can be 
revoked at any time by the testator. The Will contains 
nothing but a simple bequest; no terms of the alleged oral 
agreement are set forth in the Will; the Will is," there-
fore, no evidence whatsoever of the oral agreement suffi-
cient to remove said alleged oral agreement from the oper-
ation of the Statute of Frauds. See the many cases cited 
in our brief. 
The presumption in the absence of any indic·ation to 
the contrary will always be that a contract is to be perform-
ed at the Place where it is made. 11 Am. Jur. Conflicts of 
Laws ~ 117 Page 402. 
E·ven if the alleged oral agreement was to be perform-
ed in some other state, which we do not admit, the better 
considered cases from the point of view of principle indi-
cate that the Statute of Frauds of the state in which the 
contract is made and entered into controls as to its vali-
dity. 105 A.L.R. 675. 
Plaintiff claims that the writtin agreement of April 
22, 1918, is against public policy. · That is immaterial in 
this case. The plaintiff is not seeking to enforce or to set 
aside said written agreem·ent. Plaintiff pleaded and made 
said written agreement a part of her Complaint. She receiv-
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ed approximately $28,689.00 as the consideration for said 
agreement. Said agreement cannot now be set aside on 
the ground that it is against public policy. The matter of 
public policy does not enter into this case whatsoever. 
· · The only matter that enters into this agreement is: Was 
there a valid, binding, oral agreement that can be enforced 
in the face of the California Statute of Frauds? 
We therefore conclude that the California Statute of 
Frauds is applicable and that the alleged oral agreement 
is not enforceable in Utah. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT E.RR ON THE QUESTION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S PLE:A OF ESTOPPE·L. 
We proved at the trial of this cas.e by the citation of 
many California authorities construing the above code 
sections that the California Courts have consistently held 
that an oral agreement to devise or bequeath any property 
or to make provision for any person by will is invalid and 
unenforceable. 
In the case of Bogan vs. Wiley, decided January 14, 
1946, 164 Pac. (2d) 912, reading from page 914, the Cali-
fornia court says: 
"The code sections declare that an oral con-
tract to devise or bequeath property by will is in-
valid. Since their enactment our decisions have 
consistently held that such contracts are unen-
forceable." C'iting cases. 
In the case of Brought vs. Howard, 249 Pa-
cific 76 (Ariz.), the Arizona Court, under a sta-
tute identical with the California statute above 
quoted, approves and sustains the rulings of the 
California Courts. 
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The State of Massachusetts also has a simi-
lar provision and sustains the rulings of the Cali-
fornia and Arizona courts. The cases from Massa-
chusetts sustaining said proposition are cited in 
the Howard case above mentioned. 
We believe that from what we have said we have con-
clusively shown that an oral agreement to bequeath proper-
ty by will is invalid and unenforceable under the above sec-
tions of the California Code. Plaintiff, however, contends 
that there has been a sufficient performance of the oral 
agreement to take her case out of the Statute of Frauds 
and that the Defendant is estopped from setting up the 
statute because : 
1. John Jackson delivered to her the Benefit Certifi-
cate, Woodmen of the World, dated the 24th day of Febru-
ary, 1906, · (Pl. Ex J). 
2. Because plaintiff pursuant to said alleged oral 
agreement reared, supported and educated her children and 
. that she, therefore, fully performed her part of the oral 
agreement. 
3. That the execution of the will of September 7, 1920, 
by John Jackson (Pl. Ex. I) whereby he bequeathed $3,-
500.00 to each of his children constituted a part per-
formance of the alleged oral agreement. 
4. That said will is a sufficient writing evidencing 
said alleged oral agreement to take the ease out of the 
above sections of the California Code. 
Needless to say, we do not agree with plaintiff's con-
tentions above set forth. We contend that there has not 
been a sufficient or any performance to take the plaintiff's 
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case out of the statute; and that there is no writing evi-
dencing said alleged oral agreement and that plaintiff must 
fail on all of her contentions. 
In the case of Stevenson vs .. Pantaleone (Cal.) 21 Pa-
cific 2d 703, reading from pages 704, 705 and 706, the 
Court states : 
"The vital question to be determined is this: 
Conceding that the excluded evidence established 
an agreement, it is equally clear therefrom that 
the agreement was oral. Such being the case, 
was there, as claimed by the appellant, such a per-
formance of its terms as would raise the bar of 
the statute of frauds? 
"One of the objections upon which the offer-
ed testimony was excluded was based upon subdi-
vision 3 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, which 
section, so far as rna terial, reads as follows : 'The 
following contracts are invalid, unless the same, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writ-
ing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or 
by his agent: - - - 3. An agreement made upon 
consideration of marriage other than a mutual 
promise to marry. - - -' 
"The objection was also predicated on section 
1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and subdi-
vision 3 thereof, which is in substance the same 
as section 1624, supra. Although there was no con-
tract in writing,. nor any note or memorandum 
thereof in writing subscribed by the parties, it 
is claimed by appellant that the rejected evidence 
discloses that the contract had been fully execut-
ed by him, and partly by her, and therefore the 
statute of frauds has no application here. This 
contention is stated in the appellant's opening 
brief as follows: 'Both parties to said agreement 
performed some portion thereof. Plaintiff per-
formed each and every provision thereof on his 
part to be performed, and the only provision that 
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was not performed was the promise on the part of 
said Edith M. Hendrickson to change the benefi-
ciary or beneficiaries in her policy of insurance 
from defendants to that of plaintiff, and this ac-
tion is the result thereof.' The excluded evidence 
supports the following conclusions: That they 
agreed to get married ; that they agreed to change 
the beneficiaries from those named in the poli-
cies, in favor of each other; that the premiums on 
the policies were to be paid from their communi-
ty earnings; that no premiums were paid on the 
policy of insurance issued on the life of plain-
tiff's wife on account of sickness overtaking bet, 
and, while she was sick the premiums were taken 
care of by a provision in the policy of insurance; 
that plaintiff kept up the premiums on the poli-
cies on his life; that, but for such antenuptial 
agreement with her and its anticipated fulfill-
ment, the plaintiff would not have consummated 
the marriage and performed the agreement ori 
his part; that they were married; that the plain-
tiff thereafter changed the beneficiary named in 
the insurance policies carried on his life to his 
wife; that his wife did not change the beneficiar-
ies named in her policy to the name of the plain-
tiff; that she had stated to her beneficiaries 
that she did not intend to make a change; that she 
left her policy in the custody of the plaintiff, and 
he knew that she had not made the change. 
"Do the foregoing facts constitute part per-
formance sufficient to take the case out of the 
statute of frauds? If so, then the court erred in 
excluding the testimony ; if not, then the order of 
exclusion was properly made, for there can be no 
question that the contract was one required to be 
in writing. 
"In Hughes v. Hughes, 49 Cal. App. 206, 193 
P. 144, the plea was made that the defendant, in 
consideration of the plaintiff marrying him, 
agreed to deed plaintiff certain property ; make a 
will bequeathing to her all of his property at his 
death, and perform certain other acts. The marri-
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age was consumated, and the will was made, but 
defendant refused to convey the property. The 
above case is authority for the propositions that 
marriage does not take the case out of the statute 
of frauds; that the execution of the will was not 
sufficient part p~erformance, and the oral contract 
could not be enforced because not executed in con-
formity with subdivision 3 of section 1624 of the 
Civil Code. Also that a court of equity will not en-
force an oral antenuptial agreement to convey real 
and personal property after the marriage, unless 
it is made to appear that the promisor, by some 
fraud or deceit, prevented the oral agreement be-
ing reduced to writing. 
"In Peek v. Peek, 77 Cal. 106, 19 P. 227, 1 
L.R.A. 185, 11 Am. St. Rep. 244, it is held that 
marriage is not of itself part performanc·e of a 
parol contract to convey real property in considera-
tion of marriage, sufficient to take the case out 
of the statute of frauds. 
"In Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mas·s. 408, 4 Am. 
Rep. 573, which is cited with approval in Hughes 
v. Hughes, supra, is involved the principal appli-
cable to the case at bar. The facts alle·ged in the 
complaint in that action, to which a demurrer was 
sustained by the court, was to the effect that the 
plaintiff and one Nancy Gould agreed by prarol that 
each of them should make a will in the other's 
favor, and give and devise thereby all her property, 
both real and personal, to the <)ther, and that 
neither of them was to make any different will at 
any time, or to dispose of her property in any man-
ner different therefrom. Afterwards Nancy Gould 
made another will in favor of other p·arties, and 
died. The court said : 'There has been no part per-
formance which a1nounts to anything. The plain-
tiff says she made a will devising her property to 
Nancy. But such an instrument was ambulatory, 
and might have been revoked by various acts, or by 
implication of law from subsequent changes in the 
condition or circumstances of the testator. - - - -
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The plaintiff's property is still, as it has always 
been, in her own hands, and subject to her own 
control.' See, also, In re Edwall's Estate, 75 Wash. 
391, 13--1 P. 1041; McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 
Wash. 138, 137 P. 479, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 461. 
"In the case at bar the right to change the 
beneficiary named in the several insurance policies 
at all times rested in the insured, and, as said in 
the case last cited, concerning the power to make 
a will, the right to change the will was am hula tor J, 
and the same right exists to change the bene-fici-
ary in a policy of insurance, and not constitute a 
sufficient part performance to take the· case out of 
the statute of frauds. 
"In Browne, Stat. Fr. §§452-454; Williams v. 
Morris, 95 U. S. 444, 24 L. Ed. 360, the rule is laid 
down that it is not enoug·h that the act of part per-
formance is evidence of some agreement; but it 
must be unequivocal and satisfactory evidence of 
the particular agreement itself. To the same effect 
is Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 42-6, 44 P. 862, 
32 L.R.A. 796; Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 
182 P. 333; 58 C.J., p. 994, §190; 12 Cal. Jur. p. 
898, §60. 
"In Henry v. Henry, 27 Ohio St. 121; Finch 
v. Finch, 10 Ohio St. 501, it is held that, whe·re a 
wife, in consideration of marriage, orally agreed 
to convey real property to her husband, the marri-
age of the parties, moving onto the land and mak-
ing valuable improvements thereon, were not suffi-
cient acts of part performance to take the case out 
of the statute of frauds; such acts being as much re-
ferable to his character as a husband as under the 
oral antenuptial agreement. In Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 
Cal. App. 167-172, 182 P. 333, 335, it is said: To 
take a contract out of the operation of the statute 
of frauds, however, the acts relied upon must be 
unequivocally referable to the contract. Acts which, 
though in truth done in performance of a contract, 
admit of an explanation without sup·posing a con-
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tract, are not, in general, such acts of part per-
formance as will take the case out of the operation 
of the statute. 36 Cyc. 645. The acts relied upon 
must clearly appear to have been done in pursu-
ance of the contract, and to result from the con-
tract and not from some other relation.' (S.ee cases 
there cited.) 
"In Baker v. Bouchard, 12~ Cal. App. 708, 10 
P. (2d) 468, the decision of the court, so far as ma-
terial to the case at bar, is epitomized in the sylla-
bus as follows: 'In an action to enforce a trust in 
real property alleged to have arisen by virtue of 
an oral agreement between plaintiff· and defend-
ant's intestate whereby the decedent agreed, in 
consideration of plaintiff taking up her residence 
in decedent's home and providing and caring for 
him during his declining years, that he would make 
a will devising to her the real property in question, 
which oral agreement plaintiff claimed she fully 
performed, an attempted will by decedent devising 
said property to plaintiff which did not refer to 
the alleged oral agreement a.nd which was void for 
want of compliance with statutory provisions gov-
erning wills, did not constitute a sufficient mem-
orandum of the alleged oral agreement to comply 
with the requirement of section 1624 of the Civil 
Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. In such action the fact that plaintiff fully 
performed her part of the alleged oral agreement 
did not take the contract out of the operation of 
the statute of frauds. 
"In O'Brien v. O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577-586, 241 
P. 861, it is held that neither subsequent marriage 
nor the execution of a will pursuant to an oral ante-
nuptial agreement to make a will is such part per-
formance as will relieve the contract from the op-
eration of the statute of frauds. 
"In the case before us, the change of the bene-
ficiary by the plaintiff may be attributable to his 
character of husband, and nothing else. So far as 
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the wife is concerned, she did no act toward per-
formance. 
"In Luders v. Security Trust, etc., Bank, 121 
Cal. App. 408, 9 P. (2d) 271, 272, in an action to 
enforce a trust based on an alleged oral agreement, 
it is said: 'Nor does this case fall within the rule 
that the statute of frauds cannot be in-
voked in case of a completed oral contract 
(Schult v. Noble, 77 Cal. 79, 19 P. 182; Col-
on v. Tosetti, 14 Cal. App. 693, 113 P. 365, 366), 
for the contract now sued upon was not completed. 
The reason that the contract is now in court is be-
cause the decedent did not perform his part of the 
alleged agreement. - - - - ' 
"From the foregoing review of the evidence 
offered by the plaintiff, it is clear that Edith M. 
Hendrickson did nothing that could be construed 
as an act of part performance of the oral ante-nup-
tial agreement; even the act of marriage did not 
not constitute part performance. The only act per-
formed by plaintiff which could be attributable to 
the said agreement was the change in the benefi-
ciary in the policies of insurance issued on his life, 
and, under the above-cited authorities., such act 
was insufficient to raise the bar of the· statute. 
Such being the case, the ruling of the court sus-
taining the objections to the offered evidence was 
correct, because the agreement was not in writing 
and no facts were shown sufficient to support its 
enforcement as an executed oral agreement. The 
other questions raised, therefore, become imma .. 
terial." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona in the case 
of Brought vs. Howard, 249 Pacific 76, reading from pages 
79 and 80, states: 
"'Jonathan R. Brought's will in favor of plain-
tiff does not on its face purport to have been made 
in pursuance of any contract to make it. It merely 
indicates an intention to make a testamentary gift 
to the plaintiff. It is not a memorandum of any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
82 
contract to will or devise. As is said in Zellner v. 
Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 P. 84: 
" 'The pre-eminent qualification of a memor-
andum under the statute of frauds is 'that it must 
contain the essential terms of the contract, ex-
pressed with such a degree of certainty that it may 
be understood without recourse to parol evidence 
to show the intention of the parties.' 5 Browne on 
Statute of Frauds, sec. 371. Accordingly, it has 
been held in this state that an undelivered deed 
cannot be regarded as a sufficient memorandum of 
an oral agreement for the sale of land the·rein de-
scribed when the deed is silent as to the terms of 
the alleged agreement and merely conveys the land 
from one party to another. Swain v. Burnette, 89 
Cal. 564, 570, 26 P. 1093. In other jurisdictions the 
same reasoning has been applied to a will, for some 
reason ineffective upon the death of the testator, 
which makes no mention of the terms of the con-
tract in pursuance of which it is alleged to have 
been executed. Allen v. Bromberg, 163 Ala. 620, 50 
So. 884; McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 
138, 137 P. 479, Ann Cas. 1915A, 461. A potential 
factor in furtherance of fraud would be engendered 
were a will containing· a simple bequest permitted 
to operate as evidence of a binding contract to 
make such a bequest. It must therefore be held 
that there is no written memorandum of the agree-
ment here in suit.' 
"See, also, Watkins v. Watkins, supra; Hale v. 
Hale, 90 Va. 728, 19 S. E. 739; In re Edwall's Es-
tate, 75 Wash. 391, 134 P. 1041; Cavanaugh v. Cav-
anaugh, 120 Wash. 487, 207 P. ·657. 
"For the above reasons we conclude the plain-
tiff has failed to show herself entitled to the equit-
able relief sought, and the court did not err in so 
deciding." 
In the California case of Baker vs. Bouchard, 10 Pacific 
2d 468, reading from page 469, the Court states: 
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Hln connection with this instrument, it is to 
be observed that it contains no reference to the 
alleged oral agTeement.- --
- - -- "Section 1624 of the Civil Code and sec-
tion 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly 
provide that an agreement to devise or bequeath 
property or to make provision for any person by 
will is invalid unless the conrtact or some note or 
memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed 
by the party charged or by his agent. It is not con-
tended that there was any written memorandum 
of the alleged agreement other than the invalid 
~ill. This instrument contained a simple devise of 
the real property in question to appellant without 
reference to any agreement in respect thereto. It 
does not, therefore, constitute a sufficient memor-
andum of the alleged oral agreement to comply 
with the requirement of the above-mentioned sta-
tutes. Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 P. 84. 
In the case of Freeman, et al., vs. R~iver Farms Co. of 
California, et al., 44 Pacific 2d 422, reading from page 423, 
the Court states: 
"Respondents contend that appellant is es-
topped to set up the statute of frauds as a defense, 
but we have found no authority to support re-
spondents' contention under the facts presented 
here. Respondents take the position that as they 
had performed the work under their contr.act with 
the levee district, appellant is estopped from rely-
ing upon the statute. We believe this position to be 
untenable. Assuming, as de respondents that under 
their alleged agreement with appellant, respond-
ents agreed to do said work for the levee district 
(which assumption appears to be contrary to the 
fact), performance by one party of an alleged 
agreement does not always remove the case from 
the operation of the statute and ordinarily only 
such performance as is specified in the statute it-
self is sufficient for that purpose, O'Brien v. 
O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 241 P. 861; Baker v. 
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Bouchard, 122 Cal. App. 708, 10 P. (2d) 468, Forbes 
vs. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. App. 781, 282 P. 
528; Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 182 P. 333; 
Booth v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 21 Cal. App. 427, 
131 P. 1062. 'Furthermo·re, it is clear that, in order 
to take a contract out of the operation of the stat-
ute of frauds, the acts relied upon as establishing 
part performance must be unequivocally referable 
to the contract. If such acts, though in truth done in 
performance of a contract, admit of an explana-
tion without supposing a contract, they do .not 
generally constitute such part performance as to 
remove the case from the operation of the statute.' 
Baker v. Bouchard, supra, 122 Cal. App. page 711, 
10 P. (2d) 468, 469; see, also, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 
supra; Trout v. Ogilvie, supra." 
In the California case of Luders v. Security Trust & 
Savings Bank, et al, 9 Pacific (2d) 271, reading from pages 
271, 272 and 273, the Court states: 
"In June 1923, deceased executed a will in 
which she bequeathed her property to app~llant 
'for her faithful service to me.' Appellant seeks 
to bring this case without the provisions of the 
Statute of Frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624) by reason of 
this will, and also by her partial performance of 
the terms of the contract with deceased. She main-
tains that the will was a sufficient note or mem-
orandum in writing of the contract to take it out 
of the statute. 
"These two arguments of appellant have been 
resolved against her by the decisions of the Su-
preme and Appellate Courts of this state. These 
decisions were reviewed by this court in the re-
cent case of Cazaurang v. Carrey, 4 P. (2d) 259, 
261, where it was said: 'We think no such full per-
mance is here shown, as takes this agreement or 
these agreements out of the statute. Hughes v. 
Hughes, 49 Cal. App. 206, 193 P. 144, 145; Zellner 
v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 P. 84, 86; O'Brien v. 
O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 241 P. 861, 864. In the case 
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of Hughes v. Hughes, the court said: 'The subse-
quent making of defendant's will, in favor of the 
plaintiff, following the marriage, was not such part 
performance of the oral agreement to make such 
vvill as to take the alleged contract out of the sta-
tute of frauds.' In Zellner v. Wassman, the court 
said: 'Agreements to leave property by will must 
be reduced to writing or evidenced by some written 
note or memorandum; for, by virtue of the :1_905 
Amendment to section 1624 of the Civil Code, they 
are within the purvie\v of the statute of frauds. 
It is admitted that the agreement of the son to 
leave $5,000 by will herein sued upon was not re-
duced to writing, and that no written note or mem-
orandum thereof was made unless the will exe-
cuted by deceased, a copy of which was attached 
to the complaint, fulfills the requirements of the 
statute in that respect. The will in question con-
tained a simple bequest of $5,000 to plaintiff, 
without reference to any agreement in respect 
thereto. The pre-eminent qualification of a mem-
orandum under the statute of frauds is 'that it inust 
contain the essential terms of the contract, ex-
pressed with such a degree of certainty that it may 
be understood without recourse to parol evidence 
to show the intention of the parties.' 5 Browne on 
Statute of Frauds, § 371. Accordingly, it has been 
held in this state that an undelivered deed cannot 
be regarded as a sufficient memorandum of an 
oral agreement for the sale of land thereindes.crib-
ed when the deed is silent as to the terms of the 
alleged agreement and merely conveys the land 
from one party to another. S.wain v. Burnette, 89 
Cal. 564, 570, 26 P. 1093. In other jurisdictions 
the same reasoning has been applied to a will, for 
some reason ineffective upon the death of the tes-
tator, which makes no mention of the terms. of 
the. contract in pursuance of which it is alleged 
to have been executed. Allen v. Bromberg, 163 Ala. 
620, 50 So. 884; McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 
Wash. 138, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 461, 137 P. 479. A 
potential factor in furtherance of fraud would be 
engendered were a will containing a simple bequest 
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permitted to operate as evidence of a binding con-
tract to make such a bequest. It must therefore be 
held that there is no written memorandum of the 
agreement here in suit. Nor does this case fall 
within the rule that the statute of frauds cannot 
be invoked in case of a completed oral contract 
(Schultz v. Noble, 77 Cal. 79, 19 P. 182; Colon v. 
Tosetti, 14 Cal. App. 693, 113 P. 865, 366), for the 
contract now sued upon was not completed. The 
reason that the contract is now in court is because 
the decedent did not perform his part of the alleg-
ed agreement by causing to be in existence at the 
time of his death a will bequeathing $5,000 to 
plaintiff. The mere execution of a will was not a 
performance of the contract.' 
The Court concludes at page 273 as follows: 
"The will which deceased executed in 1923 did 
not 'contain the essential terms of the contract, ex-
pressed with such a degree of certainty that it may 
be understood without recourse to parol evidence 
to show the intention of the parties,' as required 
in the case of Zellner v. Wassman, supra, and was 
not a sufficient note or memorandum of the con-
tract to bring this case without the provisions of 
the statute of frauds." 
In the case of Brooks vs. Whitman, 10 P,ac. (2d) 1007, 
Calif. reading from page 1009, the Court states: 
"The making of a will is absolutely no evi-
dence of an agreement to make a will. As was said 
in Monson vs. Monsen, 17 4 Cal. 97, 102, 162 Pac. 90, 
92 : 'The making of a will has no tendency to show 
that there is a contractual obligation to make such 
will.' See also Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal 80, 86, 
193 Pac. 84, 87, wherein it is said, 'a potential fac-
tor in furtherance of fraud would be engendered 
were a will containing a simple bequest permitted 
to operate as evidence of a binding contract to 
make such a bequest. And in the same category 
and for the same reasons would fall statements 
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made by a party as to the fact of his having made 
a will in favor of one claiming as in the present 
case.'' 
In the case of DeMattos vs. McGovern, 77 Pac. (2d) 522 
(Cal), reading from pages 523 and 524, the Court states: 
I 
"The main difference between this case and 
those which have gone before is that the appellant 
herein insists that notwithstanding his failure to 
pursue the reg-ular remedy '\Vhich the law has given 
him, he should be permitted to invoke the equity 
jurisdiction to give him the relief which the law 
denies. On the theory that because he continued in 
the employment of the deceased in reliance upon 
the alleged agreement that agreement was partly 
executed he argues that the case is taken out of 
the statute of frauds. The premise is not sound. 
The services were rendered under a separate con-
tract of employment. The same is to be said about 
the representation that a will had already been 
made in accordance .with such an agreement. The 
execution of the will is not part performance of 
the alleged contract. Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal. 2d 
469, 47 4, 45 P. 2d 198. The right to revoke a will 
lies with the testator until the time of his death, 
and, unless limited by an agreement in writing, 
equity cannot intervene. N otten v. Mensing, supra, 
3 Cal. 2d 469, page 473, 45 P. 2d 198. 
"The case is controlled by these settled prin-
ciples: Under section 1624 of the Civil Code and 
section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an 
agreement to make a will, or to leave property by 
deed or will is invalid unless in writing. An agree-
ment not to revoke a will already made is, in effect, 
the sam·e as an agreement to make a will, and must 
also be in writing. Caza urang v. Carrey, 117 Cal. 
App. 511, 517, 4 P. 2d 259; Notten v. Mensing, 3 
Cal. 2d 469, 473, 45 P. 2d 198. 
"An oral agreement to make a will or to leave 
property by de·ed in compensation for services ren-
dered, or to be rendered, is not enforceable as such. 
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The remedy is one in quantum meruit for 
the value of the services rendered. Zellner 
v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 84, 87, 193 P. 84; 
Morrison v. Land, supra, 169 Cal. 580, pages 586, 
590, 147 P. 259; Ruble v. Richardson, 188 Cal. 150, 
154, 204 P. 572; Lauritsen v. Goldsmith, 99 Cal. 
App. 671, 675, 279 P. 168; Burr v. Floyd, 137 Cal. 
App. 692, 696, 31 P. 2d 402. 
"E·quity follows the law and, when the law de-
termines the rights of the respective parties, a 
court of equity is without power to decree relief 
which the law denies. 10 R.C.L., p. 382; Magniac 
v. Thomson, 15 How. 281, 299, 302, 14 L. Ed. 696; 
Federal Land Bank v. Wilmarth, 218 Iowa 339, 
252 N.W. 507, 513, 94 A.L.R .. 1338. 
" - - - There is, however, the complete har-
mony in the cases holding to the rule that, where 
the oral contract to compensate by will was made 
in consideration of services rendered or to be ren-
dered, the promissee's rem·edy is one at law to re-
cover the reasonable value of his services. It is 
equally well settled that before the promisee may 
maintain an action for that purpose he must file a 
claim against the estate. Morrison v. Land, supra, 
169 Cal. 580, page 585, 147 P. 259. - - - " 
The plaintiff in the case at bar is not seeking compen-
sation for services rendered nor for money expended by her 
in rearing, supporting and educating her children, which 
she claims she did under an oral agre-ement. Her claim is 
not based on quantum meruit. At the pre-trial of this case 
on March 23, 1951, plaintiff eliminated all matters relating 
to quantum meruit or the reasonable value of services ren-
dered and all matters relating to quantum meruit were 
stricken from the Complaint (R. page 93). Plaintiff filed 
no claim whatsoever against the estate on the basis of 
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quantum meruit. We believe that the cas·es cited by us con-
clusively demonstrate that plaintiff is not. entitled to re-
cover in this action; quantum me~ruit is entirely out of the 
case, no claim was filed based on quantum meruit, and she 
has stated no facts that warrant any recovery whatsoever 
in equity. 
Counsel, at page 45 of his brief, complains about the 
deceased revoking his "Contract Will," presumably the will 
made by John Jackson on September 7, 1920 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1). 
The right to revoke a will lies with the testator until 
the time of his death and unless limited by an agreement 
in writing, equity cannot intervene. Notten v. Mensing, 45 
Pac. (2d) 198 (Cal.) and other cases above cited. 
57 Am. J ur., § 458, page 322, reads in part as follows: 
"§ 458. Right, Power, and Capa,~ity to Revoke. 
Revocability is an essential characteristic of a will. 
Except where the testator subsequently becomes 
incompetent, he retains the power of revocation as 
long as he lives, and this is true regardless of whe-
ther he retains possession of the will or delivers 
possession to the beneficiary or to a third pe-rson. 
Wills are revocable to such an unlimited degree 
that even an express provision in a will providing 
that it is not revocable in no wise prevents the will 
from being actually revocable. 
"A will executed pursuant to a contract to 
make a will is revocable and is not entitled to pro-
bate if a revoking will is executed; however, the 
testator cannot relieve himself of the obligation of 
the contract by revoking the will. In other words, 
a will is revocable but a con tract to make a will is 
not. - - - " 
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See also, O'Hara vs. O'Hara, annotated at 163 A.L.R. 
1444. 
We especially call the court's attention to the case of 
In re Edwall's Estate 75 Wash. 391, 134 P. 1041 for an ex-
cellent treatise of a number of questions involved in this 
action-we will cite only that portion of the syllabus of said 
case at page 1041 which reads as follows: 
"A husband and wife, each of whom owned 
real property, executed deeds simultaneously by 
which each conveyed his or her real property to 
the other and delivered them in escrow under an 
agreement that the deed of the one first dying 
should then be recorded. They subsequently exe-
cuted wills simultaneously, which were attested 
by the same witnesses, to take the place of such 
deeds, by which each gave his or her real and per-
sonal property to the other. Neither the deeds nor 
the wills on their face made any reference to an 
alleged oral agreement that the wills should be ir-
revocable except by agreement or upon notice. Held, 
that such oral agreement was void and unenforce-
able under the statute of frauds; the deeds and 
wills not constituting sufficient evidence thereof 
in .writing." 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that under the foregoing argu-
ment and authorities the trial court did not err in its de-
cision. The judgment appealed from should therefore be 
Affirmed. 
MITCHE,LL MELICH, 
Moab, Utah. 
RUGGERI AND GIBSON, 
First National Bank Building, 
Price, Utah. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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